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ICWA DOWNUNDER: EXPLORING THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENACTING AN 
AUSTRALIAN VERSION OF THE UNITED 
STATES’ INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
Marcia Zug* 
Australian Indigenous Advocates have long sought the 
passage of Indigeous child-welfare legislation similar to 
the United States’s  Indian Child Welfare Act. Recently, the 
Australian government has indicated it is receptive to the 
enactment of such legislation. However, an Australian 
version of the ICWA is not as simple as it sounds. The legal 
status of the Indigenous communities of Australia and 
American Indian tribes is vastly different  thus, many of the 
ICWA’s provisions, particularly those based on a 
recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, would require 
significant modifications before they coud be applied in 
Australia. These modifications mean an Australian ICWA 
could not be as robust as the American version of the Act. 
Nevertheless, with these changes, an Australian version of 
the ICWA is feasible and could significantly reduce 
Indigenous child removals and the break up of Indigenous 
families and communities in Australia.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2019, I stood outside my flat in Canberra, 
Australia and looked up as the words “I’m Sorry, 10” were 
slowly written across the sky. The words commemorated 
the ten years since Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
issued his official apology for the Australian government’s 
role in the “Stolen Generation”, the decades-long policy of 
removing Indigenous children from their families and 
communities.1 
Rudd’s apology was of monumental importance.2 It 
was the first time the Australian government had ever 
 
*  I would like to thank Professors Lorana Bartels, Patricia Easteal, Terri 
Libesman, Nicole Watson, and Jennifer Hill for their support and 
encouragement with this project. I would also like to thank the 
University of Canberra and the US-Australian Fulbright Commission 
for making this research possible. 
1  Abbie O’Brien, “‘We Say Sorry’: Today Marks More than a Decade 
Since Kenvin Rudd’s National Apology”, SBS News (13 February 
2018), online: <www.sbs.com.au/news/we-say-sorry-today-marks-
more-than-a-decade-since-kevin-rudd-s-national-apology>. See also 
Andrew Gunstone, “Reconciliation, Reparations and Rights: 
Indigenous Australians and the Stolen Generations” in Damien Short 
& Corinne Lennox, eds, Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
(New York: Routledge, 2016) 301. 
2  See Danielle Celermajer, The Sins of the Nation and the Rituals of 
Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 212. 
Celermajer notes that “even people who had expressed cynicism about 
the apology or who were not sympathetic to the new government found 
themselves profoundly involved and affected.” See also Don Watson, 
speaking in Geraldine Doogue, “Reflections on the Apology 
Saturday”, ABC News (16 Feb 2008), online: 
<www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/saturdayextra/reflections-
on-the-apology/3284448>. Watson stated, “I think it’s a different 
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apologized for the terror and devastation it had inflicted on 
generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
families.3 At the same time, Rudd’s apology had little 
practical effect. More than ten years after the apology and 
decades after the official end of the child removal policy, 
Indigenous families in Australia continue to face 
unjustifiably high rates of separation.4 Thus, it seemed 
fitting that the word “apology” began disintegrating before 
it was even fully written against the sky.5 
I was in Australia because I hoped to help 
Indigenous families affected by Australia’s child removal 
policies. More specifically, I was there to research whether 
an American law, a statute known as the Indian Child 
Welfare Act or ICWA, might model a potential solution.6 
 
country since [the apology] . . . I think it’s a bit different in most of our 
heads, whether we’re for or ag[ainst] it. And I think that Kevin Rudd 
has given a sort of moral compass to the matter of our relations with 
Aboriginal Australia.” 
3  See e.g. Elizabeth Keenan, “Australia Learns to Say ‘I’m Sorry’”, Time 
(1 February 2008) (discussing the decision to issue a national apology).  
4  See Gunstone, supra note 1 at 309 (explaining that the government had 
previously acknowledged the removal of Indigenous children, but that 
this was the first time it had specifically apologized for doing so). 
5  See e.g. ibid at 309. They note that notwithstanding the apology, 
“Indigenous peoples and communities impacted upon by the 
legislation, policies and practices that resulted in the stolen 
generations, continued to be refused substantial justice by the Federal 
government.” 
6  In this article, I primarily use the term Indian or American Indian rather 
than Native American, First Nations, or Indigenous when discussing 
the indigenous people of the United States. I recognize that this term 
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The ICWA is an American law passed to address the 
legacy of the United States’ [US] own Indigenous family-
separation policies. The law helps ensure Indigenous 
family preservation through provisions that prevent the 
unnecessary removal of Indian children as well as 
provisions that help families regain custody of their 
children when they are removed. 
For decades, Aboriginal advocates and their 
supporters have pushed for the passage of an Australian 
ICWA.7 More recently, non-Indigenous groups such as the 
 
can be controversial. However, because it is common in both the 
academic literature and in the majority of statutes and case law, I have 
chosen to use it in this article. See also Michael Yellow Bird, “What 
We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial 
and Ethnic Identity Labels” (1999) 23:2 American Indian Q 1, citing 
Hilary N Weaver, “Introduction” in Marvin D Feit, John S Wodarski 
& Hilary N Weaver, eds, Voices of First Nations People: Human 
Services Considerations (New York: Haworth Press, 1999) for further 
information on this topic. Yellow Bird notes that both the terms 
“‘American Indian’ and ‘Native American’ are the most common 
racial and ethnic labels used to identify the general population of 
Indigenous Peoples in the United States” and that “neither term has 
been without controversy, and no clear consensus exists on which label 
is most preferable.” In addition, I will primarily use the term 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander when discussing Indigenous 
people of Australia. However, I will also use the term Indigenous while 
recognising that this term may not adequately capture the rich and 
diverse cultures of Aborignal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
7  See Richard Chisholm, “Aboriginal Child Welfare and the Possibility 
of Federal Laws” (1982) 1:6 Aboriginal L Bull 6. Chisholm notes that 
he was asked by representatives of Aboriginal Child Care Agencies 
“whether it would be possible for the Commonwealth Parliament to 
pass legislation similar to the Indian Child Welfare Act 1978 of the 
USA.” See also Brian Butler, “Aboriginal Child Protection in The 
Practice of Child Protection: Australian Approaches” in Gillian 
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Australian Law Reform Commission have also suggested 
that the Commonwealth “should establish a national 
inquiry into child protection laws and processes affecting 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children.”8 However, 
an Australian version of the ICWA is not as simple as it 
sounds. The legal status of the Indigenous communities of 
Australia and American Indian tribes is vastly different. 
Most significantly, the US federal government recognizes 
the sovereignty of American Indian nations, albeit in a 
limited and precarious way,9 while the Australian 
government does not recognize Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander sovereignty. Many of the ICWA’s provisions are 
based on a recognition of tribal sovereignty, consequently, 
 
Calvert, Adrian Ford & Patrick Parkinson, eds, The Practice of Child 
Protection: Australian Approaches (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 
1992) at 19. They state: “[o]ur organisation also seeks the enactment 
of national legislation along the lines of the Indian Child Welfare Act.” 
See also Paul Grey, “Protecting Indigenous Children: 3 Lessons 
Australia Could Learn from the United States”, Medium (29 October 
2017), online: <medium.com/@AbSecNSW/protecting-indigenous-
children-3-lessons-australia-could-learn-from-the-united-states-
5b4e076c10d9>. They ask the Australian government to pass 
legislation similar to ICWA to strengthen protections for Aboriginal 
families. See generally Linda Briskman, The Black Grapevine: 
Aboriginal Activism and the Stolen Generations (Sydney: Federation 
Press, 2003) at 110–19. Briskman discusses the various efforts to 
secure national legislation similar to ICWA. 
8     Austl, Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Pathways to 
Justice—An Inquiry into the Incaceration Rate of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133) (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 2017) at 18.  
9  See Part II.A of this article for a discussion of the history of and current 
limitations on the exercise of tribal sovereignty in the United States. 
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the Act cannot simply be imported into Australia. An 
Australian ICWA would require significant modifications. 
This article examines how the ICWA would have to 
change to operate in Australia and whether, so modified, it 
could still effectively protect Aboriginal families. 
Ultimately, this article concludes that an Australian ICWA 
would not be as robust as the American version of the Act, 
but that it could still significantly reduce Indigenous child 
removals and strengthen Indigenous families and 
communities in Australia. Part I will demonstrate why an 
Australian ICWA is needed. Part II will describe the history 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights. Part III will 
examine the limitations of an ICWA created pursuant to 
delegated authority and how an Australian ICWA could 
potentially avoid or overcome these drawbacks. Part IV 
will evaluate the weaknesses of the Indigenous child 
protection in the United States and suggest how an 
Australian ICWA could avoid these problems. Part V will 
discuss the benefits and potential advantages of an 
Australian ICWA as compared with the US version. 
Finally, the conclusion will consider how the passage of an 
Australian ICWA could affect Indigenous self-
determination rights more generally. 
I. THE NEED FOR AN AUSTRALIAN ICWA 
A. A SECOND STOLEN GENERATION? 
As mentioned above, Australian Indigenous advocates 
have long sought the passage of legislation resembling the 
ICWA. However, an examination into the potential benefits 
of an Australian ICWA is now particularly timely and 
important due to the fact that Australia’s long-standing 
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aversion to permitting the adoption of any Australian 
children, and Indigenous Australian children in particular, 
is quickly disappearing.10 In March 2018, the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and 
Legal Affairs began an inquiry into the possibility of 
creating a national framework for domestic adoption.11 The 
Standing Committee inquiry noted the significant variation 
in the legislation and practices that apply to adoptions 
throughout Australia.12 Eight months later the Committee 
published its report. It recommended implementing a 
national adoption framework to provide uniformity to 
Australian adoption law and to increase the rate of 
Australian children being adopted.13 This recommendation 
 
10  See Austl, Commonwealth, House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Breaking Barriers: A 
National Adoption Framework for Australian Children – Inquiry into 
Local Adoption (October 2018) at 5–6 [Breaking Barriers]. The report 
noted that the most frequently cited barrier to domestic adoption “was 
fear of repeating the mistakes of past forced adoption policies and 
practices that were in place from the 1950s until the 1980s.” See also  
Jeremy Sammut, “Our Reluctance Towards Adoption is Hurting 
Children”, ABC News (21 April 2015) (explaining how past removal 
policiesd have affected current Australian attitues towards adoption); 
Leigh Cambell, “The Current State of Adoption in Australia”, 
Huffington Post (9 November 2016) (discussing how Australians’ 
“negative attitudes towards adoption” effect adoption rates). 
11  See Parliament of Australia, Media Release, “Inquiry into Local 
Adoption” (2018), online: 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Social
_Policy_and_Legal_Affairs/Localadoption>. 
12  See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 8. 
13  See ibid at 32 (Recommendation 2). 
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appears to herald a major shift in how domestic adoption is 
viewed in Australia.14  
The renewed adoption interest in Australia raises 
particular concerns for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander children.15 Currently, these children are subject to 
extremely low rates of adoption.16 However, that could 
change if a national adoption law is implemented. 
Although the Parliamentary Inquiry into Adoption 
recognized that Australia’s history of forced Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander child adoptions creates unique 
concerns regarding the adoption of these children, it still 
included them in the inquiry and ultimately recommended 
 
14  The shift towards easing adoptions restrictions can also be seen in 
recently enacted legislation, such as recent laws passed by the New 
South Wales Parliament permitting children to be adopted without 
parental consent. See Lorena Allam, “Adoption without Parental 
Consent Legalised in NSW”, The Guardian (23 November 2018), 
online: <www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2018/nov/23/adoption-without-parental-consent-legalised-in-
nsw>. See also Patrick Wood, “Adoptions on the Rise After Droping 
to Record Low Last Year”, ABC News (11 December 2017), online: 
</www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-12/adoption-rates-on-rise-after-
dropping-to-record-low/9248958> (Adopt Change CEO Renee Carter 
noted “an encouraging shift in thinking [about adoption] in Australia”). 
15  Critics such as Professor Terri Libesman have noted that this move 
towards adoption may also be motivated by financial and political 
concerns. In recent years, the number of Australian children in out-of-
home care has grown at alarming rates and the cost of this care was 
estimated at 2.2 billion Australian dollars in 2013–14. See Terri 
Libesman, “Indigenous Child Welfare Post Bringing Them Home: 
From Aspirations for Self-Determination to Neoliberal Assimilation” 
(2015) 19:1 Austl Indig L Rev 46 at 54.  
16  Since 1993, only 125 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
have been adopted and half of those children were adopted by 
Indigenous families. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 58. 
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including them in the proposed national framework.17 Due 
to this inclusion, the need for national Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander child protection legislation is now 
more pressing than ever. 
It is possible that when national adoption 
legislation is ultimately enacted it will contain specific 
protections or exceptions for Indigenous children, 
however, it would be unwise to rely on such possibilities. 
In fact, expecting such protections is especially risky given 
the fact that recent adoption reforms enacted at the state 
level did not exempt Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
families. For example, in November 2018, the New South 
Wales government passed The Children and Young 
Persons (Care and Protection) Amendment Bill 2018.18 
This Act expands the ability of family and community 
services to permanently remove children from their 
families and, most worryingly, places a two-year time limit 
on finding a permanent placement for such children.19 
 
17  The Committee Report noted that the organizations consulted 
regarding the possibility of aboriginal child adoptions all advised 
against it. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 5–6, 29, 56, 65–74, 
83–84. Breaking Barriers ignored this advice, stating that although 
“family preservation and cultural considerations are important”, they 
are “not more important than the safety and wellbeing of the child.” 
The Committee then recommended the enactment a national adoption 
law for all children. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at xvii. 
18  See Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Amendment 
Act 2018 (NSW) 2018/81. 
19  The most important of the proposed changes are the following: (1) 
Placing a two-year time limit on creating a permanent arrangement for 
the child (ibid, Schedule 1, s 20, amending s 79); (2) making 
guardianship order by consent outside of court (ibid, Schedule 1, s 19, 
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These reforms were fiercely opposed by Indigenous 
advocates20 who warned they would create a second Stolen 
Generation. Unfortunately, their objections were ignored 
and the changes were instituted with no exceptions or 
additional protections for Indigenous children.21 
Consequently, an Australian ICWA is needed not only to 
address the continuing effects of the original “stolen 
generation,” but to also prevent the creation of a second 
one. However, because the legal position of American 
Indians and Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
 
amending s 74); (3) amending how families can apply for restoration 
(ibid, Schedule 1, throughout); (4) removing parental consent to 
adoption for children on permanent orders. See Alison Whittaker & 
Terri Libesman, “Why Controversial Child Protection Reforms in 
NSW Could Lead to Another Stolen Generation”, The Conversation 
(12 November 2018), online: <theconversation.com/why-
controversial-child-protection-reforms-in-nsw-could-lead-to-another-
stolen-generation-106330>. 
20  See e.g. Pip Hinman, “NSW Law Will ‘Lead to a New Stolen 
Generation’”, Green Left Weekly (3 December 2018), online: 
<www.greenleft.org.au/content/nsw-law-will-lead-new-stolen-
generation>. Hinman notes that “Indigenous groups, unions, the NSW 
Greens and the Labor Party oppose the new law and organized several 
protests outside NSW Parliament. Seventy-nine organizations and 
more than 2000 individuals signed an open letter to the Premier, urging 
her ‘to put these reforms on hold and engage in genuine dialogue with 
all stakeholders, including Aboriginal communities and community 
organisations supporting children in families.’” 
21  See ibid. See also Marlene Longbottom et al, “Indigenous Australian 
Children and the Impact of Adoption Legislation in New South Wales” 
(2019) 393 Lancet 1499, online (pdf): 
<www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(19)30252-
1.pdf>. Longbottom notes that “[f]or Indigenous Australian children, 
this new law risks permanently separating another generation from 
their families.” 
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Islander people is not equivalent, it is necessary to first 
understand the history and application of the ICWA in the 
United States before considering how the Act could be 
imported into Australia. 
B. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ICWA 
In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the ICWA in 
response to the shockingly high rates of Indian child 
removals that were continuing through the country.22 The 
legislative reports noted that these removals were 
frequently based on biased views about proper child 
rearing and that Indian families, following traditional child 
rearing practices, were particularly vulnerable. According 
to these reports, state welfare workers viewed these 
families as backward, uncivilized, and unfit to raise 
children.23 The reports also noted that some state welfare 
 
22  By the 1970s, US removal policies had decimated Indian communities. 
At least one-third of all American Indian children were being separated 
from their families which was substantially higher than the removal 
rates for non-Indian children. In Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, 
and Washington, the removal rates for Indian children compared with 
non-Indian children was five to nineteen percent higher. In Wisconsin, 
the rate of removal for Indian children was 1,600 times greater. See 
Lorie M Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes: A Contextual Critique of 
the Existing Indian Family Doctrine” (1998) 23:1 Am Ind L Rev 1 at 
24. See also Elizabeth MacLachlan, “Tensions Underlying the Indian 
Child Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court 
Family Law Matters” (2018) 2 BYUL Rev 455 at 456–57. They note 
that “[t]he purpose of ICWA is to reverse the historic and recent effects 
of removal of Indian children from their homes and tribal 
communities.” 
23  See US, Establishing Standards For The Placement Of Indian 
Children In Foster Or Adoptive Homes, To Prevent The Breakup Of 
Indian Families, And For Other Purposes (HR Rep No 95-1386) 
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workers removed children simply because they were living 
on an Indian reservation which, as one California case 
worker put it, “is an unsuitable environment for a child.”24 
These reports prompted Senator James Abourezk, one of 
the main sponsors of the ICWA, to vigorously advocate for 
the law’s passage.25 Abourezk believed that a national 
Indian child welfare law was the only way to counteract the 
harms caused by state welfare agencies “operat[ing] on the 
 
(reprinted in 1978 USC CAN 7530, 7532)  (documenting the 
discriminatory practices of state and private adoption,welfare agencies, 
and state court’s abuse of their power) [HR Rep].  See also Sarah 
Krakoff, “They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and 
the Constitutional Minimum” (2017) 69:2 Stan L Rev 491 at 506. 
Krakoff iterates that “Congressional reports documented the ignorance 
and hostility of state social workers and judges toward tribal culture 
and its benefits. . . . [S]tates asserted exclusive jurisdiction and denied 
due process in state proceedings brought to remove Indian children 
from their families”, quoting Nell Jessup Newton, Felix Cohen & 
Robert Anderson, eds, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
§ 11.01[2] at 832 [Cohen’s Handbook].  
24  Graham, supra note 22 at 27. 
25  See Patrice H Kunesh, “Borders Beyond Borders - Protecting Essential 
Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act” 
(2007) 42 New Eng L Rev 15 at 41: 
 The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977, 
S. 1214, introduced on April 1, 1977 by Senator 
James Abourezk (S.D.), Chairman of the Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, was co-sponsored by 
Senators Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) and George 
McGovern (S.D.), and referred to the Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs. 
Senator Abourezk sponsored a similar bill, S. 3777, in 
the 94th Congress, which was referred to the Senate 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and later 
referred to the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs where 
no action was taken. 
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premise that most Indian children would really be better off 
growing up non-Indians.”26 
The ICWA vigorously rejects the idea that Indian 
children are better off growing up away from their Indian 
families and tribes. As the preamble states, the goal of the 
Act is to: 
protect the best interests of Indian children 
and to promote the stability and security of 
Indian tribes and families by the 
establishment of minimum Federal standards 
for the removal of Indian children from their 
families and the placement of such children 
in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect 
the unique values of Indian culture.27 
The Act seeks to achieve this goal of protecting 
Indian families in a number of different ways but one of the 
most important is by placing limitations on discretion of 
state court judges presiding over cases involving Indian 
children.28 It does this by recognizing and expanding the 
authority of tribal courts over Indian child cases and by 
requiring state courts to apply specific protections and 
procedures when such cases are not removed to tribal court. 
 
26  James Abourezk, quoted in Graham, supra note 22 at 25.  
27  The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-908, 92 Stat 3069 
(codified as amended at 25 USC §§ 1901–1963). 
28  See Paul David Kouri, “In re M.J.J., J.P.L., & J.P.G: The ‘Qualified 
Expert Witness’ Requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act” (2005) 
29:2 Am Indian L Rev 403 at 406. 
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The Act protects tribal court authority and power 
by recognizing tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction over child 
custody determinations involving Indian children residing 
or domiciled within an Indian reservation.29 It also requires 
state courts to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal courts in any 
proceeding for foster care placement or parental rights 
terminations involving Indian children not domiciled 
within the reservation.30 In addition, the Act guarantees 
tribes or any “Indian custodian of the child” the right to 
intervene “at any point” in any state court proceeding for 
the foster care placement or termination of parental rights 
of an Indian child31 and it requires states to give full faith 
and credit to tribal court proceedings.32 
For Indian child custody cases that are not 
transferred to tribal court, the Act includes numerous 
requirements that limit the discretion of state courts. For 
example, the Act requires that state courts apply specific 
placement preferences when determining the custody of 
Indian children.33 In addition, the Act mandates that notice 
is given to both the child’s parents and tribe of any pending 
action,34 that “active efforts” are made to “provide 
remedial services and rehabilitation programs” to help 
 
29  See 25 USC § 1911(a). 
30  See 25 USC § 1911(b). There are some exceptions to this transfer 
provision. Specifically, the provision requires that neither parent 
objects to the transfer and that there is an absence of good cause not to 
transfer. The tribe may also decline to take jurisdiction in such cases. 
31  25 USC § 1911(c). 
32  See 25 USC § 1911(d). 
33  See 25 USC § 1915(a). 
34  See 25 USC § 1912(a). 
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prevent breaking up the Indian family, and that any court 
order placing an Indian child in foster care35 or terminating 
the rights of an Indian child’s parents, is supported by 
sufficient evidence including testimony of a qualified 
expert witness.36 
These ICWA protections, those recognizing and 
protecting tribal court authority and those limiting state 
court discretion, have been instrumental in helping combat 
the legacy of the US’s Indian child removal policies. 
C. AUSTRALIA’S INDIGENOUS CHILD 
REMOVALS AND RESPONSE 
The Indigenous child removals currently taking place in 
Australia share many similarities with those occurring in 
the US shortly before ICWA’s passage. At that time, 
differences between Indian and non-Indian conceptions of 
the family and “good” child rearing practices, were 
routinely used to justify breaking up Indian families. In 
Australia, such negative perceptions about Indigenous 
families are common and similarly used to justify the 
removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children.37  
 
35  25 USC § 1912(d). 
36  This must be demonstrated “by clear and convincing evidence” in the 
case of foster care placement. See 25 USC § 1912(e). See also 25 USC 
§ 1912(f) (“beyond reasonable doubt” in termination proceedings). 
37  Although there seems to be an increasing willingness to recognize past 
injustices towards Aboriginal people, the most recent reconciliation 
barometer survey (a survey conducted every two years), revealed 
troubling statistics about the levels of racial prejudice that Indigenous 
people currently face. According to the survey “[o]ne in three 
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Studies such as the Bringing Them Home Report38 note that 
modern Indigenous child removals are frequently caused 
by divergences between Indigenous and Western 
conceptions of kinship and good child rearing practices.39 
A highly public example of such divergence was recently 
demonstrated on episode of the Sydney morning show, 
Sunrise Sydney. In that episode, the program’s two hosts 
advocated for expanding the adoption of Aboriginal 
children by white families, because they believed it was the 
best way to “save” them. The hosts recognized that their 
suggestion sounded similar to the policies that created the 
Stolen Generation. However, instead of being apologetic, 
they embraced this comparison stating, “[j]ust like the first 
Stolen Generation, where a lot of children were taken 
because it was for their well-being, we need to do it 
 
Indigenous respondents to the survey said they had endured verbal 
racism in the past six months. Almost half (43 percent) of First Nations 
people said they had been subjected to some form of racial prejudice 
during the same period.” Ben Smee, “Truth Telling: 80% Say Past 
Injustices Against Indigenous People Should Be Recognised”, The 
Guardian (10 Feb 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2019/feb/11/truth-telling-80-say-past-injustices-against-
indigenous-people-should-be-recognised>. 
38  See Austl, Commonwealth, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry 
into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from their Families (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1997) [Bringing Them Home]. 
39  See ibid at 478–80, 486. They note that the Australian family law 
system conflicts with Aboriginal child rearing values. See also John 
Dewar, “Indigenous Children and Family Law” (1997) 19:2 Adel L 
Rev 217 at 221. Dewar notes that Indigenous “conceptions of kinship 
and good child-raising practice are significantly different from the 
nuclear model.” 
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again.”40 The hosts also scoffed at the idea that keeping 
Indigenous children connected to their culture was 
important. Instead, in a comment dripping with sarcasm, 
they asked: “We need to be . . . putting them back into that 
culture, what culture are they growing up seeing?”41 
These types of biases regarding the benefits of 
assimilation an a devaluing of Indigenous culture remain 
common in Australia.42 As historian Tim Rowse has noted, 
Australia’s history of and desire for assimilation is “built 
into the very fabric Australian society . . . we cannot say 
that it came to an end.”43 Professor Terri Libesman has 
echoed this point, noting that in recent years, there has been 
an increasing shift away from the recognition of “collective 
histories and rights” to a greater focus on “mainstream 
 
40  Emma Reynolds, “‘You Should Know Better, Sunrise’”, The Morning 
Bulletin (14 March 2018), online: 
<www.themorningbulletin.com.au/news/you-should-know-better-
sunrise-breakfast-show-slam/3360362/>. Reynolds states that “Sunrise 
is facing a backlash after a discussion on taking Aboriginal children 
out of abusive family environments sparked accusations of ‘blatant 
racism’ and ‘bottom feeding.’” 
41  Ibid. 
42  Other examples of such views in the popular press include shock jock 
radio host Alan Jones’s claim on radio 2GB that “we need another 
stolen generation.” See Graham Richardson, “Alan Jones Isn’t Racist, 




43  See Tim Rowse, “Introduction” in Tim Rowse & Richard Nile, eds, 
Contesting Assimilation (Perth: API Network, 2005) 19, cited in Anna 
Haebich, “Neoliberalism, Settler Colonialism and the History of 
Indigenous Child Removal in Australia” (2015) 19:1 Aus Indig Rev 20 
at 21. 
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measures of well-being.”44 Professor Libesman believes 
this has led to a “greater prevalence of populist racist 
characterisations of neglect and abuse as pertaining to 
cultural and individual Indigenous deficits.”45 
Distressingly, these types of biases against 
Indigenous families are even held by the organizations and 
agencies tasked with helping them. In their work on 
Indigenous child removals, Professors Kyllie Cripps and 
Julian Laurens have demonstrated that bias against 
Indigenous families and culture has led child welfare 
agencies to devalue the importance of keeping Indigenous 
children connected to their culture and communities and to 
promote beliefs about Indigenous “dysfunctionality” in 
order to justify government intervention.46   
 
44  Haebich, supra note 43 at 28. 
45  Ibid. 
46  In this study, Kyllie Cripps and Julian Laurens argue that the child 
welfare system’s bias towards permanency hurts Indigenous children 
by preferring the mainstream child welfare goal of permanency over 
connection to community. They suggest that the general neoliberalism 
that currently defines Australia‘s child welfare policy is used to both 
“justify intervention” into Indigenous people’s lives and that it relies 
upon and promotes the narrative of Indigenous “dysfunctionality.” 
Kyllie Cripps & Julian Laurens, “The Protection of Cultural Identity in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children Exiting from Statutory 
Out of Home Care via Permanent Care Orders: Further Observations 
on the Risk of Cultural Disconnection to Inform a Policy and 
Legislative Reform Framework” (2015) 19:1 Austl Indigenous L Rev 
70 at 77. See also Jacynta Krakouer, Sarah Wise & Marie Connolly, 
“‘We Live and Breathe Through Culture’: Conceptualising Cultural 
Connection of Indigenous Australian Children in Out-of-Home Care” 
(2018) 71:3 Australian Social Work 265 at 269. They found “that 
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Scholar and social worker Doctor Steve Rogowski 
has made similar observations. Rogowski notes that 
organizations, like the Cape York Family Responsibility 
Commission, offer support to Indigenous families, but 
condition it on a willingness of the recipients to change 
their lifestyles by joining the market economy and 
becoming “responsible citizens.”47 
It is difficult to prove that such biases are 
responsible for the high rates of Indigenous child removals 
in Australia. However, there is little question that 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children are removed 
at disproportionately high rates when compared with their 
non-Indigenous peers. These children made up 
approximately 36 percent of all children living in out-of-
home care (OOHC) in 2015, a rate nearly ten times that of 
other children.48 Moreover, as this disproportionate 
representation continues to grow,49 it is becoming 
 
Indigenous agencies and workers believed that family, community, and 
cultural connection was a primary fundamental need for Indigenous 
children in care, whereas non-Indigenous agencies and workers saw 
cultural connection as just ‘one of many hierarchical needs.’” 
47  Steve Rogowski, “From Child Welfare to Child 
Protection/Safeguarding: A Critical Practitioner’s View of Changing 
Conceptions, Policies and Practice” (2015) 27:2 Social Work in Action 
97 at 97. 
48  See Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 70. The number of Indigenous 
children removed and placed in OOHC now is higher than it was in 
2008 at the time of the National Apology. 
49  See Robyn Mildon & Melinda Polimeni, Parenting in the Early Years, 
Effectiveness of Parenting Support Programs for Indigenous Families 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012). See also 
Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 70 noting that “the rate of 
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increasingly clear that the only significant nationwide 
attempt to combat bias against Aboriginal families, the 
Aboriginal Child Placement Principle (ACPP), is not 
working.50  
The ACPP is a set of guidelines first articulated by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Care Agencies 
concerning the care and custody of Indigenous children.51 
 
Indigenous children entering OOHC was 9.5 times that for non-
Indigenous children.” 
50  See also Fiona Arney et al, Enhancing the Implementation of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Child Placement Principle: 
Policy and Practice Considerations (Melbourne: Child Family 
Community Australia, 2015). They note “the lack of adherence to the 
Principle,” “that the best interests of children have not been considered 
paramount in determining placements for Indigenous children,” and 
“that cultural identity and connection have not always been a 
consideration when making decisions about the best interests of 
children.” See also Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 76 describing 
the “haphazard” application of the Placement Principles. 
51  Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
Enhancing the Implementation of the Aboriginal Child Placement 
Principle by Fiona Arney et al (Melbourne: AIFS, 2015), online: 
<aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/enhancing-implementation-aboriginal-
and-torres-strait-islander-child/export> (noting “[t]he Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Child Placement Principle grew from a 
grassroots community movement initiated by Aboriginal and Islander 
Child Care Agencies (AICCAs) during the 1970s”). The guidelines 
were derived from the proceedings for the First Australian Conference 
on Adoption which occurred in 1976. See Austl, Commonwealth, 
Australian Law Reform Comission, Recognition of Aboriginal 




principle/>, s 352 (the section entitled “The Application of the 
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 The Principle states that “Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander children should be raised in their own 
families and communities and if placed in out-of-home 
care . . ., should be placed with Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander carers.”52 Each Australian state and territory has 
enacted a version of the Principle into their adoption and 
child welfare legislation. Unfortunately, compliance is 
low. Studies indicate there is a 34 percent “non-compliance 
rate” with the placement principle and that it is 
increasing.53  
 
‘Paramount Consideration’ to Aboriginal Children: Policy 
Guidelines”). 
52  Claire Tilbury, “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Child Placement 
Principle: Aims and Core Elements” (June 2013) at 2, online (pdf): 
Secretariat of National Aboriginal and Islander Child Care 
<www.snaicc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/03167.pdf>. 
53   See also Calla Wahlquist, “Number of Indigenous Children in Care to 
Triple Unless Spending Changes—Report”, The Guardian (28 
November 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2017/nov/29/number-of-indigenous-children-in-care-to-triple-
unless-spending-changes-report>, noting that as of 2016, only sixty-
seven percent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
removed from their parents were placed with “family, kin, or an 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander carer.” In addition, the rate of 
placement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander carers (excluding 
non-Indigenous family and kin) was only 50.5 percent. See also 
Krakouer, Wise & Connolly, supra note 46 at 268–69, noting that “[i]n 
Victoria, the Commission for Children and Young People . . . recently 
found ‘a lack of evidence to demonstrate that Aboriginal children are 
being placed at the highest level of the placement hierarchy’. The 
Taskforce 1000 project, where the files of almost 1000 Indigenous 
children in care in Victoria were audited, found that more than 60 
percent of Indigenous children live in OOHC with non-Indigenous 
carers.” See also Commission for Children and Young People, “In the 
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As discussed above, in 2008, Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd apologized to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people for the Stolen Generation and promised to take 
action to protect Indigenous families. Notably, Rudd ended 
the Apology by stating, “We take this first step . . . in 
laying claim to a future where we embrace the possibility 
of new solutions to enduring problems.”54 Sadly, in the 
decade since Rudd’s apology, the Commonwealth has 
offered no new solutions.55 Consequently, it is time to 
reconsider the enactment of an Australian ICWA. In the 
US, the Act has successfully helped combat unjustified 
 
Child’s Best Interests: Inquiry into compliance with the intent of the 
Aboriginal Child Placement Principle in Victoria” (2015), online (pdf): 
<ccyp.vic.gov.au/assets/Publications-inquiries/In-the-childs-best-
interests-inquiry-report.pdf>. See also Austl, Commonwealth, 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child Protection Australia 
Report: 2014–15 (Child Welfare Series No 63) (Canberra: AIHW, 21 
April 2016) at 54–55 (noting that 66 percent of Indigenous children 
were placed in accordance with the ATSICPP). 
54  Kate Grenville, “A True Apology to Aboriginal People Means Action 
as Well”, The Guardian (14 February 2010), online: 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/14/australia-
aboriginals-apology-disadvantaged> (quoting Kevin Rudd). 
55  See e.g. Austl, Senate, Community Affairs References Committee, Out 
of Home Care (19 August 2015), online: 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Comm
unity_Affairs/Out_of_home_care/Report>, discussing the 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
and making recommendations that have not been implemented. See 
Dan Conifer, “Bringing them Home, Twenty Years After Report 
Indigenous Children are Worse Off Than Before”, ABC News (25 May 
2017) (noting “key recommendations from the national inquiry have 
not been implemented and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
children now make up a larger part of the out-of-home care system”). 
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Indian child removals.56 A similarly structured act could 
have a comparable impact in Australia, but only if 
Australia’s long-standing opposition to Indigenous self-
determination begins to decline. Luckily, there are 
indications this may be occurring.  
II. CHILD WELFARE AND ABORIGINAL AND 
TORRES ISLANDER SELF-DETERMINATION 
As Part I of this article discussed, Indigenous advocates in 
Australia have long sought an Australian version of the 
ICWA57 and the recently proposed changes to Australia’s 
 
56  See e.g. Sheri L Hazeltine, “Speedy Termination of Alaska Native 
Parental Rights: The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid 
Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates of the Federal 
Indian Child Welfare Act” (2002) 19:1 Alaska L Rev 57 at 59 
(describing the ICWA as “one of the most important and far-reaching 
pieces of legislation protecting Indian tribes”). See also Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, “Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism” (2010) 42:1 
Ariz St LJ 253 at 284 (describing the ICWA as “perhaps the most 
important legislation enacted during this era”); Barbara Ann Atwood, 
“Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance” (2002) 51:2 Emory LJ 587 
at 621 (noting that “[t]he ICWA has achieved considerable success in 
stemming unwarranted removals by state officials of Indian children 
from their families and communities”); Christine Basic, “An Overview 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978” (2007) 16:1 J Contemp L Iss 
345 at 349 (stating that “the Act is a success with regard to its goal of 
giving Indian tribes more power over their members in general, over 
their children in particular”); Graham, supra note 22 at 34 (stating that 
“there is a general consensus among Native American nations and 
organizations that the ICWA provides ‘vital protection to American 
Indian children, families and tribes’”). 
57  See e.g. supra note 7 presenting numerous requests for ICWA-type 
legislation. See also Terri Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child 
Welfare:Comparative Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) at 
 
184 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
 
federal adoption law have made the need for such 
protective legislation more pressing than ever. Moreover, 
although previous efforts to enact ICWA-type legislation 
were unsuccessful, there is reason to believe future efforts 
may enjoy greater success. 
Previous attempts to enact ICWA-like legislation 
were stymied by a lack of public and government support 
for Indigenous self-determination.58 However, recent 
Indigenous child welfare initiatives, such as those 
implemented in Victoria and Queensland, appear to 
indicate that despite the previously discussed biases, there 
is also an increasing receptiveness for Aboriginal and 
Torres Islander self-determination, particularly in the area 
of child welfare.  
A. SOVEREIGNTY, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES, 
AND THE ICWA 
The purpose of the ICWA is to keep Indian children with 
their families and communities or, failing this, with other 
Indian families or communities. The Act achieves this goal 
by ensuring the majority of Indian child welfare decisions 
are made by the child’s tribe. Under the Act, the term 
“tribe” refers to “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as 
eligible for the services provided to Indians by the 
 
116 [Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare] (describing 
how the ICWA has “served as an inspiration to Indigenous children’s 
[welfare] groups internationally”). 
58  See Briskman, supra note 7 at 119–21 describing the decades long 
efforts by Indigenous advocacy groups to pass national Aboriginal 
child welfare legislation. 
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Secretary because of their status as Indians.”59 Such tribes 
are recognized as possessing the inherent right to make 
decisions concerning the care and welfare of their 
members. Specifically, they are treated as quasi-
sovereigns,60 which means they enjoy a special relationship 
with the federal government and that they can pass laws 
and have those laws enforced within their reservation.61 
However, quasi-sovereignty also means that tribes do not 
possess the full powers of sovereignty.62 Instead, they are 
subject to the overriding control of the United States and 
may not exercise any sovereign powers abrogated by 
Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian 
 
59  25 US § 1903(8) (the definition of “Indian tribe”). 
60  See Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831) [Cherokee 
Nation]. The concept of limited sovereignty was first presented by 
Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation, in which he described 
Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” at 2. See also United 
States US v Kagama, 118 US 375 (1886) (noting that although tribes 
are physically within the territory of the United States, they nonetheless 
remain “a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal 
and social relations” at at 381–82). 
61  See e.g. Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 US 463 (1979) at 500–01 [Washington v Yakima 
Indian Nation], quoting Morton v Mancari, 417 US 535 (1974) at 551–
52 (“‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits 
the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, 
legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive” 
(challenging Mancari’s application to the ICWA)). 
62  See United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313 (1978) at 323 (describing 
Indian tribes’ sovereignty as “unique and limited [in] 
character. . . exist[ing] only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject 
to complete defeasance”). 
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affairs.63 Nevertheless, even within these limitations, the 
sovereignty American Indian tribes continue to posses and 
wield is significant. 
As the US Supreme Court explained in Williams v 
Lee, unless tribes have been divested of a particular right, 
they retain the inherent “right [. . .] to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.”64 Moreover, although Congress 
may divest tribes of various aspects of their sovereignty,65 
states are prohibited from exercising powers that would 
intrude on Indians’ right to sovereignty.66 These long-
accepted ideas regarding Indian sovereignty were 
incorporated into the ICWA. Specifically, the Act 
recognizes that the care and control of Indian children is 
one of the core areas of tribal sovereignty, that this right 
 
63  See e.g. Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978) 
[Oliphant] (holding that tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians because the federal government did not 
intend for non-Indian citizens to be adjudicated by tribal governments 
under tribal laws that might treat such defendants unfairly or impair 
their liberty interests). 
64  Williams v Lee, 358 US 217 (1959) at 220 [Williams].  
65  In fact, Congress has the ability to eliminate all sovereign rights of 
Indian tribes. This power was clearly demonstrated through the policy 
of termination which terminated the federal tribal relationship and left 
the affected tribes on the same footing as any other group or 
community of people in the United States. See generally Charles F 
Wilkinson & Eric R Biggs, “The Evolution of the Termination Policy” 
(1977) 5:1 Am Indian L Rev 139 at 151–54 (discussing the devastating 
effects of termination legislation). See also Cohen’s Handbook, supra 
note 23 at § 3.02[8][b] (discussing the effects of termination on the 
tribal statuses of specific tribes). 
66  Williams, supra note 64 at 220 (confirming that state action is 
prohibited if it undermines “the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them”). 
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has never been eliminated, and tribes may exercise this 
right free from state or federal interference.67  
B. INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia does not have the United States’ history of 
recognizing Indigenous sovereignty and the right of native 
people to make and be governed by their own, separate 
laws. In fact, such ideas actually conflict with the long-held 
view that Indigenous people in Australia should not have 
special rights.68 As Australian Professor Richard Chisholm 
noted, in Australia, it is a commonly held view that “the 
only future aboriginal people can, or should, have is as 
ordinary members of the Australian community with 
exactly the same legal rights and responsibilities.”69 
 
67  The fact that Congress could eliminate this right does change the fact 
that a recognition of tribal sovereignty is an essential aspect of how the 
ICWA operates in the United States. 
68  One arguable exception is native title property rights. See Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23. See also Lisa Strelein, 
Compromised Jurisprudence, Native Title Cases Since Mabo 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2009) (discussing native title 
cases since Mabo). See also Sean Brennan et al, eds, Native Title From 
Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 2015). 
69  Richard Chisholm, “Towards an Aboriginal Child Placement 
Principle: A View from New South Wales” in Bradford W Morse & 
Gordon R Woodman, eds, Indigenous Law and the State (Dordrecht, 
Holland: Foris, 1988) 315 at 318. Rob Riley posits that Indigenous 
Australians are often treated as a minority with no rights or at best, only 
those rights “that the majority group will allow, those rights that will 
not interfere with the administration and development of the country in 
the best interests of the majority.” See Rob Riley, “Aboriginal Law and 
its Importance for Aboriginal People: Observations on the Task of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission” in ibid 65 at 66. 
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Consequently, Australia’s strong support of Indigenous 
assimilation has long hampered efforts to pass national 
Indigenous child welfare legislation.70 However, recently 
enacted Indigenous child welfare programs in Victoria71 
and Queensland72 demonstrate that opposition to 
Indigenous control over child welfare is decreasing.73  
For example, under the new Victorian program, the 
guardianship of Aboriginal children has been transferred 
from the state to the chief executive of an Aboriginal 
 
70  Briskman, supra note 7 at 116 noting a reason “for the resistance is the 
broader question of Aboriginal self-determination.” 
71  See Calla Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges Record Funds to Keep 
Indigenous Children in Community Care”, The Guardian (26 April 
2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2018/apr/26/victoria-pledges-record-funds-to-keep-indigenous-
children-in-community-care> [Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges”]. 
72  See Noel Niddrie & Kylie Brosnan, “Evaluation: Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Family Led Decision Making Trial” (October 
2017), online (pdf): <www.snaicc.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Evaluation_Report_ATSIFLDM-2018.pdf>. 
73  These new programs do not give Indigenous communities decision-
making power and thus, cannot be considered a sufficient substitute for 
a national legislation akin to the ICWA. However, they do indicate 
growing support for Aboriginal involvement in implementing the child 
welfare policies that affect their children and communities. See 
Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare, supra note 57 at 
117 (noting that many of these programs were inspired by the Canadian 
practice of delegating case management control to tribes; that led to the 
development of memorandums of understanding between Australian 
state child welfare departments and Australian Indigenous 
Organizations). 
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community-controlled organization (ACCO).74 Previously, 
all children in care worked solely with the State 
government through the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS). Under the new program, Aboriginal 
child cases will now be handled by ACCOs and it is 
expected that by 2021,75 100 percent of such cases will be 
under the supervision of these organizations.76 Victoria’s 
strong commitment to this plan is apparent in the progress 
that has already occurred. In a March 2018 statement, 
Victoria’s Minister for Families and Children, Jenny 
 
74  Austl, Victoria, Transitioning Aboriginal Children to Aboriginal 
Community-Controlled Organisations: Transition Guidelines 
(Melbourne: Health and Human Services, October 2018), online 
(word): <providers.dhhs.vic.gov.au/transitioning-aboriginal-children-
aboriginal-community-controlled-organisations-transition> 
[Transitioning Aboriginal Children] (stating “[t]he Victorian 
government is committed to self-determination and self-management 
for Aboriginal people. This commitment includes enabling Aboriginal 
children and young people subject to protection orders and placed in 
the out-of-home care service system to be case managed, wherever 
possible, by an ACCO” at 4). Under this change, Muriel Bamblett, 
chief executive of the Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency, 
became the legal guardian of dozens of Aboriginal children formly 
under state guardianship. See Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges”, supra 
note 71.  
75  The Aboriginal Children’s Forum (ACF) was established as a result of 
an Aboriginal Children’s Summit convened by Minister Mikakos in 
August 2015. The ACF is a representative forum of Aboriginal 
Community-Controlled Organizations (ACCOs), the community 
sector, and is government-convened quarterly. The forum was 
established to drive the safety and well-being of Aboriginal children 
and young people in or at risk of entering OOHC. 
76  These recommendations were set by the ACF. See Transitioning 
Aboriginal Children, supra note 74 at 4–5. See also Austl, Victoria, 
“Aboriginal Children’s Forum” (26 June 2019), online: 
<www.vic.gov.au/aboriginal-childrens-forum>. 
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Mikakos, noted “the significant progress we have made in 
transitioning Aboriginal children on protection orders to 
Aboriginal organisations, . . . in fact we have reached a 
milestone of a quarter of those children having 
transitioned.”77 
Like Victoria, Queensland has also made concerted 
efforts to increase Aboriginal control over child welfare 
cases. Recently, the state trialled a model of family-led 
decision-making and then committed to its state-wide 
implementation. According to Queensland’s action plan, 
the state recognizes that in order to ensure all Indigenous 
children in Queensland “grow up safe and cared for in 
family, community and culture,” there is a “need to 
‘change tracks’” and try a new way of protecting 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families.78 As part of 
this new approach, Queensland has promised to “share 
power and responsibility with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander leaders.”79 It has also agreed to “[i]nvest in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-
controlled organisations [and] to implement Aboriginal 
 
77  Jenny Mikakos, “Aboriginal Children’s Forum” (8 March 2018), 
online: Jenny Mikakos: Member for Northern Metropolitan 
<www.jennymikakos.com.au/parliament/aboriginal-childrens-
forum/>. 
78  Austl, Queensland, “Changing Tracks: An Action Plan for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Children and Families” (2017), online (pdf): 
<www.communities.qld.gov.au/resources/campaign/supporting-
families/changing-tracks.pdf> at 2. 
79  Ibid at 20. 
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and Torres Strait Islander family-led decision-making 
across the state.80 
The Victoria and Queensland programs are the 
most significant state efforts to increase Indigenous control 
over child welfare decisions. However, other states have 
also made progress. For example, New South Wales 
outlined its vision for greater Aboriginal control in its Plan 
on a Page for Aboriginal Children and Young People 
2015-202181 and through a set of Guiding Principles.82   
The Plan on a Page seeks to create a strong safety 
net of Aboriginal-controlled organizations that would meet 
the needs of Aboriginal children and their families.83 
Similarly, the Guiding Principles aim to foster 
collaboration and cooperation between Family and 
 
80  Ibid at 21. 
81  See Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat 
(AbSec), “Delivering Better Outcomes for Aboriginal Children and 
Families in NSW” (May 2018), online (pdf): 
<www.absec.org.au/~abab2882/images/downloads/NSW-Election-
Platforms-AbSec-May-2018_final.pdf> at 4; AbSec, “Plan on a Page 
for Aboriginal Children and Young People 2015-2021”, online (pdf): 
<www.absec.org.au/images/downloads/Plan-for-Aboriginal-
Children-and-Young-People.pdf > [Plan on a Page]. It should also be 
noted that although the NSW government has committed to this plan, 
they have not yet provided funding.  
82  See Grandmothers Against Removals (GMAR), “Guiding Principles 
for Strengthening the Participation of Local Aboriginal Community in 
Child Protection Decision Making” (Aug 2015), online (pdf): Family 
& Community Services 
<www.facs.nsw.gov.au/about/media/news/archive?a=373233> 
[GMAR, “Guiding Principles”]. 
83  See Plan on a Page, supra note 81. 
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Community Services (FACS) offices and Aboriginal 
communities.84 This collaboration would then enable 
Aboriginal communities to “participate with FACS in 
decision making regarding the care and protection” of their 
children.85 According to AbSec,86 both initiatives “[lay] a 
strong foundation for . . . the development of an 
Aboriginal-led service system to meet the needs of 
Aboriginal children and families.”87 
These initiatives indicate growing political and 
popular support for Indigenous decision-making in the 
child welfare context and suggest the likelihood of 
increased receptivity to national Indigenous child 
protection legislation. This change, combined with 
Australia’s potential new adoption policies suggest that it 
may be time for Indigenous advocates in Australia to renew 
their efforts to enact ICWA-type legislation.88 
Nevertheless, before beginning such advocacy, it is 
 
84  See GMAR, “Guiding Principles”, supra note 82 at 3. 
85  Ibid at 6. 
86  The Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat 
(AbSec) is a not-for-profit incorporated community organization that 
is recognised as the peak New South Wales Aboriginal Organization 
providing child protection and out-of-home care policy advice on 
issues affecting Aboriginal children, young people, families, and 
carers. 
87  AbSec, “Sector-Led Change Priorities for NSW”, online (pdf): 
<www.absec.org.au/images/downloads/FamilyMattersNSW_Final_D
igital.pdf>. 
88  See Libesmen, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare, supra note 57 
(noting that “[l]eading Indigenous groups have called for national 
legislation, inspired by the ICWA in the United States, to provide a 
framework for the provision of child welfare services to Australian 
Indigenous communities for many years” at 145). 
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important to understand how an Australian ICWA would 
differ from the American version and whether these 
differences will impact the effectiveness, as well as the 
desirability, of such legislation. 
III. AN AUSTRALIAN ICWA 
In the United States, tribes exercise decision-making 
authority over Indian child welfare cases due to their 
inherent sovereign authority. This authority is neither 
delegated by the state or federal government nor is it 
subject to state or federal oversight. Consequently, rather 
than giving tribes rights, the Act protects rights tribes 
already possess. In contrast, in Australia, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples do not enjoy recognized 
sovereignty.89 As a result, the decision-making powers 
necessary for an Australian ICWA to function would need 
to be delegated by the Commonwealth.90 The first question, 
 
89  They also do not have constitutionally protected rights of any kind, 
unlike the Indigenous people in both Canada and the United States. See 
e.g. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (providing constitutional protections to the 
Indigenous peoples of Canada). See also US Const art I, § 8, stating 
“The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes.” 
90  See Gaynor Macdonald, “Indigenous Treaties are Meaningless 
Without Addressing the Issue of Sovereignty”, The Conversation (14 
June 2018), online: <theconversation.com/indigenous-treaties-are-
meaningless-without-addressing-the-issue-of-sovereignty-98006> 
(discussing the problems with the proposed state treaties). While it 
remains possible that Indigenous sovereignty could be recognized by 
federal government, it is unlikely. Moreover, although some states and 
territories, most notably Victoria and the Northern Territory, have 
expressed willingness to enter into treaties with Aboriginal and Torres 
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therefore, is whether the Commonwealth possesses the 
authority to delegate such powers. 
A. THE POWER TO CREATE ICWA 
Since 1967, when s. 51 of the Australian Constitution was 
amended,91 the federal government has had the power to 
legislate with regard to Aboriginal and Torres strait 
Islander people and, accordingly, to pass legislation akin to 
the ICWA.92 In fact, in 1997, the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission specifically noted that the 
Commonwealth had the power to enact such legislation 
stating: 
The Commonwealth Government arguably 
already has the power to implement such 
legislation under s 51(xxvi) of the 
Constitution which gives the Commonwealth 
“special powers” to legislate for Aboriginal 
people. The Commonwealth also 
 
Strait Islander communities, as states and they do not actually possess 
the sovereignty necessary to enter into treaties with sovereign nations.  
91  See Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 (Cth), 1967/55, s 2. 
92  The amendment empowered the Commonwealth Government 
(concurrently with the states) to enact “special laws” in respect to 
Indigenous Australians. Before this amendment, the Commonwealth 
could only enact such laws with regard to other racial groups. Section 
51 does not require the Commonwealth to exercise these powers. 
However, it is important to note that when the Commonwealth has used 
this power, it has been to enact laws relating solely to Indigenous 
Australians. See Shireen Morris, “Undemocratic, Uncertain and 
Politically Unviable? An Analysis of and Response to Objections to a 
Proposed Racial Non-Discrimination Clause as Part of Constitutional 
Reforms for Indigenous Recognition” (2014) 40:2 Monash UL Rev 
488 at 492. 
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unquestionably has the power under s 51 
(xxix) of the Constitution which allows the 
Federal Government to legislate to bring into 
effect treaties, such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“UNCROC”), which Australia has ratified. 
Australia is obliged under Article 4 of 
UNCROC to undertake all legislative, 
administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of rights under UNCROC.93 
Cases like Gerhardy v Brown,94 also suggest that a 
law like the ICWA, which singles out Indigenous people for 
special treatment, is permissible.95 As the court held in 
 
93  Briskman, supra note 7 at 115. 
94  See Gerhardy v Brown, [1985] HCA 11 [Gerhardy]. The court in 
Gerhardy held that it is permissible to single out Aboriginal people for 
special benevolent treatment without violating the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), 1975/52 [RDA]. It should be noted that 
this power is highly controversial in part due to the fact that the court 
has held it permits race-based legislation that both advantages and 
discriminates against Indigenous people. See generally Sarah 
Pritchard, “The Race Power in Section 51 (XXVI) of the Constitution” 
(2011) 15:2 Austl Indigenous L Rev 44. 
95  See Gerhardy, supra note 94. Gerhardy is a case in which a defendant, 
who was not a member of the Pitjantjatjara and thus had no right to 
enter lands restored to Pitjantjatjara communities under the Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA), 1981/20, 
challenged his prosecution for illegal entry by arguing that the statute 
limiting his access violated the RDA. The court disagreed, finding that 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 12 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into 
force 4 January 1969) [ICERD], this statute was excluded from the 
category of racial discrimination. See also Morris, supra note 92 (“the 
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Gerhardy, “[s]pecial measures taken for the sole purpose 
of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or 
ethnic groups or individuals . . . in order to ensure such 
groups or individuals equal enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” are excluded from the category of 
racial discrimination.96 
Furthermore, even if the courts were to conclude 
the Commonwealth does not currently possess the 
constitutional power to enact an ICWA, it would still be 
possible for states to refer this power to the federal 
government and have the Act passed pursuant to this 
delegation. A similar cross-vesting scheme occurred with 
regard to federal jurisdiction over ex-nuptial children. 
Under s. 51 (xxi) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth 
has law-making power over marriage and the children of 
married couples, but not over de facto couples or their 
children. This was problematic because the Family Court 
could only deal with separations and custody disputes 
between legally married couples. The court had no 
jurisdiction over the de facto families. To solve this 
problem, most of the states referred responsibility for these 
 
High Court has indicated that the Race Power can probably be used for 
beneficial or adverse use against particular races” at 492).  
96  See ICERD, supra note 95. In fact, under the ICERD, such an exception 
is required. See ibid, art 2 (“State Parties shall, when the circumstances 
so warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, 
special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and 
protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for 
the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” at s 2). 
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families to the Commonwealth.97 If needed, a similar 
political solution could be used to provide federal 
jurisdiction over Indigenous child welfare cases. 
Given the above options, the enactment of national 
Indigenous child welfare legislation should be legally 
permissible. The thornier question is how a law written to 
protect American Indian families would have to change to 
work in Australia and whether these changes would defeat 
the overall purpose of the Act. 
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF  INDIAN TRIBES AND 
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER 
COMMUNITIES 
The US Congress passed the ICWA to stop the widespread 
termination of Indian parents’ rights and to reduce the 
number of Indian children placed with non-Indian foster 
and adoptive families. To achieve this goal, the Act 
contains numerous protections against the unjustified 
removal of Indian children. Many of these protections, 
particularly the ones directed at state courts, appear fairly 
easy to apply to Australian courts. For example, one of the 
most important state court directed provisions is § 1915, 
which contains the placement preferences and is very 
 
97  All states except Western Australia have referred powers regarding de 
facto couples. The reason Western Australia is an exception is that it 
set up its own family court under state law. See Robert S French, “The 
Referral of State Powers” (2003) 31:1 UWA L Rev 19.   
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similar to the Aboriginal Child Placement Principle which 
already applies to Indigenous child placements.98   
Other provisions, such as the Act’s “active efforts” 
requirement, which requires child welfare workers to take 
additional steps to attempt to reunite Indian families after a 
child has been removed,99 its notice requirements and its 
heightened evidentiary standard should also be fairly easy 
to adapt to the Australian legal system. None of these 
provisions contain concepts foreign to Australian law or 
are based on legal or judicial structures that do not exist in 
Australia. Nevertheless, many other areas of the ICWA are 
less easily imported. The three most difficult concern 
reservation lands, tribal membership, and tribal 
jurisdiction. 
1. Reservations 
Many of the ICWA’s provisions protect a tribe’s sovereign 
right to make decisions concerning the care and welfare of 
its members, particularly when those members reside 
within the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation.100 
Indigenous communities in Australia do not enjoy 
 
98  By itself, the ACPP has had had only limited success. However, as part 
of an Australian ICWA, it should have greater impact. See Part IV, 
above, for a discussion on the creation of Indigenous tribunals to 
implement the Act. 
99  25 USC § 1912(d). 
100  The US Supreme Court’s definition of “Indian reservation” is land 
“validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the 
superintendence of the government.” United States v Pelican, 232 US 
442 (1914) at 449. Under the ICWA, tribes have exclusive jurisidiction 
to determine the care of custody of a child “who resides or is 
domiciled” on a reservation. See 25 USC § 1911(a). 
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recognized sovereignty or reservations of land over which 
they may exercise sovereignty.101 This is potentially 
problematic because reservation boundaries often 
determine whether a tribal or state court has the authority 
to determine the custody of an Indian child under the 
ICWA. However, it is well-established that reservation 
boundaries are not perfectly aligned with the boundaries of 
tribal sovereignty.102 Moreover, this is particularly true 
with regard to child custody cases. As an example, the US 
Supreme Court held in Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, a tribe’s right to exert exclusive 
jurisdiction over an Indian child-custody case is not limited 
to instances where an Indian child is born or physically 
 
101  See Leon Terrill, “Converting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Land in Queensland into Ordinary Freehold” (2015) 37:4 Sydney L 
Rev 519 at 521. Terrill explains that Indigenous people own 22.4 
percent of the land in Australia, including approximately 45 percent of 
the landmass in the Northern Territory. But, “[n]either statutory land 
rights nor native title convey any form of jurisdictional authority, in 
the way that reserve land in North America does.” Ibid at 533. 
Indigenous ownership does come with certain additional rights, 
however, these mostly relate to “control over exploration and mining 
and additional protection from compulsory acquisition.” Ibid. 
102  Tribal sovereignty may be limited within reservation boundaries. See 
e.g. Montana v United States, 450 US 544 (1981) (holding that the tribe 
lacked jurisdiction to regulate the hunting and fishing of non-Indians 
within the reservation’s boundaries). See also Oliphant, supra note 63 
at 212 (holding that tribes cannot criminally prosecute non-Indians 
even for crimes committed within reservation boundaries). In addition, 
some have suggested that tribal jurisdiction may extend beyond the 
reservation boundaries, particularly with regard to tribal children. See 
e.g. Patrice H Kunesh, “Borders beyond Borders - Protecting Essential 
Tribal Relations off Reservation under the Indian Child Welfare Act” 
(2007) 42:1 New Eng L Rev 15 at 53–57 (arguing that there should not 
be any fixed boundaries delimiting tribal jurisdiction over Indian 
children who are wards of the tribal court). 
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residing on the reservation.103 The Holyfield Court 
recognized that the ICWA was written to protect the rights 
of tribes and tribal families and to do so, it must be able to 
reach outside the reservation boundaries in certain 
instances.104 
The determinative factor when faced with questions 
of the ICWA’s applicability is a child’s tribal citizenship or 
eligibility for tribal citizenship, not their physical presence 
on the reservation. Consequently, Australia’s lack of 
defined Indigenous lands akin to Indian reservations 
should not prove a significant impediment to the 
importation of ICWA type legislation. However, the issue 
of how to translate the provisions relying on tribal 
membership may prove a bit trickier. 
2. Membership 
The ICWA only applies to Indian children, a term defined 
as children who are enrolled members of an Indian tribe or 
eligible for enrollment.105 As quasi-sovereign entities, 
American Indian tribes have the inherent power to 
 
103  See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30 
(1989) (finding that the Indian children were still “domiciled” on the 
reservation despite the fact that their mother had left the reservation to 
give birth) [Holyfield]. 
104  Specifically, the Court held that despite the fact the mother had 
physically left the reservation to give birth, she and the children were 
domiciliaries and thus the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the adoption petition for her children. See ibid at 48. 
105  See 25 USC § 1903(4) (defining Indian child to mean “any unmarried 
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is 
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”). 
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determine their membership free from federal or state 
interference.106 As a result, nearly every federally 
recognized tribe has established clear enrollment 
criteria.107 They also typically compile detailed 
membership rolls and have genealogy documents covering 
more than a century.108 Consequently, the question of 
whether a particular child is covered by the ICWA is 
typically easy to determine.109 However, that is not to 
 
106  See Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978) [Martinez]. 
107  This membership criteria can vary widely from tribe to tribe. See 
Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Women and International Human Rights 
Law: The Challenges of Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and Self-
Determination” (2010) 15:1 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff 187 at 219–
20. Tsosie states that “[s]ome tribes require that the parents be 
domiciled on the reservation at the time of the child’s birth. Some tribes 
require lineal descendency from a male member, or alternately, from a 
female member. This last requirement may reflect a traditional notion 
of membership based on patrilineal or matrilineal descent.” 
108  See Addie C Rolnick, “Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond 
Citizenship and Blood” (2015) 39:2 Am Indian L Rev 337 (noting that 
almost all tribes have “adopted formal enrollment criteria and 
document enrollment via certificates or lists of members” at 380). See 
also Jessica A Clarke, “Identity and Form” (2015) 103:4 Cal L Rev 747 
(noting that “[m]any base rolls were determined by a federally 
authorized census of tribal members, taken around the turn of the 
twentieth century” at 803). 
109  See e.g. Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl, 731 SE (2d) 550 (SC Sup Ct 
2012) [Adoptive Couple]. In that case, there were difficulties 
determining the child’s eligibility for membership, but this was due to 
a misspelling of the father’s name and inaccurate birthdate in the 
adoption attorney’s submission to the tribe rather than any unclear 
membership criteria on the part of the tribe. Moreover, these 
inaccuracies may have been intentional. See ibid at 554. Today, most 
controversy surrounding membership tends to focus on challenges to 
tribal enrollment criteria given that enrollment determines a host of 
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suggest that tribal membership determinations in the 
United States are without problems. 
Tribal membership rolls grew out of lists compiled 
by US government officials as a means to determine and 
limit who would be entitled to tribal money and property. 
The historic lists were often inaccurate and many excluded 
large numbers of individuals, who should have been 
designated as tribal members.110 In addition, there are 
 
significant benefits. As a result, there have been many legal challenges 
filed when tribes have changed enrollment criteria and thus 
“disenrolled” some portion of their membership. See Joanne Barker, 
Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011) (stating that “[s]pecific rights that 
issue from [enrolled] membership include voting in tribal elections; 
holding tribal office; sharing in tribal revenue; the use of tribal lands 
and natural resources. . . and housing, health care, and education” at 
82). See also Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v Phebus, 5 F Supp 
(3d) 1221 (D Nev 2014) (involving a tribal member involuntarily 
disenrolled as a result of an internal review of enrollment criteria); 
Brackeen v Zinke, 338 F Supp (3d) 514 (ND Tex 2018) [Brackeen] 
(sub nom Brackeen v Bernhardt), rev’d 937 F (3d) 406 (5th Cir 2019), 
reh'g en banc granted 942 F (3d) 287 (5th Cir 2019). In that case, the 
issue was not whether the child was eligible for tribal membership but 
whether, regardless of membership, the Act was unconstitutional. See 
ibid (“A.L.M. is an Indian child under the ICWA and the Final Rule 
because he is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe—his biological 
mother is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation and his biological 
father is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation” at 525). 
110  See Rolnick, supra note 108 (“[i]t is difficult to tell whether tribes 
would have adopted these descent requirements if the federal 
government had not first refused to recognize anyone as Indian who 
did not have a sufficient degree of Indian blood” at 431). The 
controversy over the Cherokee Freeman also highlights this problem. 
Many of the Freemen likely had Indian blood but we characterized 
them as “black” based on the racist “one drop” policy of the time. See 
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entire tribes that are historically, culturally, and genetically 
“Indian”, yet, because these tribes did not have official 
dealings with the US government during the colonial or 
revolutionary period, they lack a recognized federal–tribal 
relationship and, thus, are ineligible for the benefits of the 
ICWA or most other federal Indian legislation.111 
 
Cody McBride, “Placing a Limiting Principle on Federal Monetary 
Influence of Tribes” (2015) 103:2 Cal L Rev 387 (“the rolls were 
wildly inaccurate, and it is unclear how many people with Cherokee 
blood were listed on the non-blood rolls simply due to their African 
American appearance” at 405). 
111  See Mark D Myers, “Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the 
United States” (2001) 12:2 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 271 at 274: 
 There are many reasons a tribe might remain 
unrecognized. In some cases, entire tribal groups were 
never recognized due to their small size or the fact that 
that they never had significant dealings with the U.S. 
government. Many of these tribes never made war on 
the U.S., or they reached agreements only with the 
British crown or colonial governments. The AIPRC’s 
final report to Congress identified a variety of 
“historical accidents” that seem to explain why some 
tribes have not been federally recognized… 
 The federal definition of “Indian” is complicated and while most 
federal stautes require membership eligibility some do not. For 
example, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 USC 
§1601ff covers members of terminated and state-recognized tribes and 
descendants of members of such tribes, in addition to members 
of federally recognized tribes. See e.g. Margo S Brownell, “Who Is an 
Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal 
Indian Law” (2001) 34:1 U Mich JL Reform 275 (describing the 
nuances of federal laws based on different definitions of “Indian” at 
282). See also Sharon O’Brien, “Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does 
the United States Maintain a Relationship?” (1991) 66:5 Notre Dame 
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Unlike the US government, Australia did not 
compile detailed membership or census rolls. 
Consequently, it could be difficult for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities to create membership 
criteria based on documented, historic descent. However, 
this lack of record keeping may actually be a benefit.112 As 
mentioned above, in the US, reliance on historic 
membership lists has created a system in which tribal 
membership is often determined in ways that can be 
underinclusive and even unjust.113 More importantly, 
although this historic connection to a federal–tribal 
relationship has become a legal requirement for all federal 
 
L Rev 1461 (discussing laws that apply based on blood quantum at 
1484). 
112  See notes 116–119 and accompanying body text, below, for a 
discussion of the three-part aboriginality test. 
113  A federally recognized tribe is one which has a government-to-
government relationship with the United States. However, there are 
many Indian tribes that do not enjoy this relationship. Some of these 
tribes have state recognition which entitles them to certain state rights, 
but many have neither state nor federal recognition and, therefore, are 
not entitled to any special rights. See e.g. Rebecca Tsosie, “Tribal Data 
Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing ‘Indigenous Data 
Sovereignty’” (2019) 80 Mont L Rev 229 at 239 (noting “many 
Indigenous groups are not protected by the federal trust responsibility, 
such as state-recognized tribes that lack federal recognition and non-
recognized tribes that seek federal and/or state recognition. Indigenous 
peoples who lack federal recognition also lack the ability to make laws 
and apply them to a trust territory. They are also unlikely to have the 
authority to protect the interests of tribal members to the extent that 
these interests are separate and distinct from the interests of all citizens 
(such as privacy) and assuming that the federal or state government is 
unwilling to extend the rules that are applicable to federally-
recognized tribal governments.”) 
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laws pertaining to Indian people in the United States, it is 
otherwise irrelevant to goals of the ICWA. 
The purpose of the ICWA is to protect modern day 
connections between an Indian child and their family and 
tribal community.114 Consequently, when considering the 
application of ICWA-type legislation to Australian 
Indigenous groups, documentary proof of a historic 
connection to a particular ancestor should be unimportant. 
What matters is that a modern day Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander community can demonstrate that the child or 
their parent is a part of that community. 
Consequently, the difficulty in translating the 
applicability provisions of the ICWA to the Australian 
context is not whether a particular Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander community can prove the child’s historic 
connection to their community but rather, whether their 
present-day membership determinations will be recognized 
as legally valid. 
For American Indian tribes, the right to set 
membership criteria free from government interference and 
 
114  Simply having an Indian ancestor is not enough for ICWA to apply. 
ICWA requires a much more recent connection in the form of 
membership or eligibility for membership of the Indian child which 
typically means at least one parent is a member of a recognized Indian 
tribe. See 25 USC § 1901. See also Kevin Noble Maillard, “The 
Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry 
from Racial Purity Law” (2007) 12:2 Mich J Race & L 351 at 381 
describing the common occurrence of Americans who claim to have an 
“‘Indian Princess Grandmother’ [which] does not assert a commonality 
of interests with a pan-Native community. Rather, it announces a 
connection to an ambiguity of indigenousness that is more historic than 
personal.” 
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control is well-established. It is recognized as part of the 
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes.115 In Australia, the 
right to define Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
membership has been partially delegated to these 
communities through the adoption of the three-part 
definition which states “[a]n Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander is a person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
descent who identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander and is accepted as such by the community in which 
he (she) lives.”116 Although this definiton gives some 
control to Indigenous groups to define their membership,117 
 
115  See Martinez, supra note 106 (finding the tribe had the ability to set 
membership criteria based on otherwise unconstitutional gender 
distinctions because membership determinations were a core aspect of 
tribal sovereignty with which the federal government could not 
interfere). 
116  Austl, Commonwealth, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Report on 
a Review of the Administration of the Working Definition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Canberra, 1981), cited in 
Austl, Commonwealth, The Definition of Aboriginality (Research 
Note 18, 2000–01) by John Gardiner-Garden (5 December 2000) at 
1. Interestingly, this is also the same test used to determine Métis 
membership in Canada. See R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43. 
117  See e.g. Gibbs v Capewell, [1995] FCA 1048 at para 21 [Gibbs]: 
 Aboriginal communal recognition will always be 
important, when it exists, as indicating the 
appropriateness of describing the person in question 
as an “Aboriginal person”. Proof of communal 
recognition as an Aboriginal may, given the 
difficulties of proof of Aboriginal descent flowing 
from, among other things, the lack of written family 
records, be the best evidence available of proof of 
Aboriginal descent. While it may not be necessary to 
enable a person to claim the status of an “Aboriginal 
person” for the purposes of the Act in a particular 
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the interpretation of the three-part test and in particular, the 
weight to be given to each of the three criteria typically 
remains with the Commonwealth.118 Consequently, it is the 
government and not the Aborignal or Torres Strait Islander 
community that gets the ultimate say in membership 
determinations.119 
Having the government define Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander community membership for purposes 
of an Australian ICWA is potentially problematic because 
it would almost certainly limit the scope and protections 
such an Act.120 Nevertheless, even if the government 
 
case, such recognition may, if it exists, also provide 
evidence confirmatory of the genuineness of that 
person’s identification as an Aboriginal. 
118  See e.g. ibid (the court stated “where a person has only a small degree 
of Aboriginal descent, either genuine self-identification as Aboriginal 
alone or Aboriginal communal recognition as such by itself may 
suffice, according to the circumstances” at para 20).  
119  The importance of Aboriginal membership designation recently gained 
national attention in Love v Commonwealth of Australia; Thoms v 
Commonwealth of Australia, [2020] HCA 3 in which two Aboriginal, 
non-citizen men were ordered deported but challenged the Australian 
government’s right to deport persons who were members of an 
Aboriginal community. See Helen Davidson, “Citizenship Test: Court 
to Decide whether Indigenous People can be Deported from Australia”, 




120  For example, the justices’ questioning during oral arguments at the US 
Supreme Court for Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl demonstrated that 
many had issues with the child’s designation as Cherokee and would 
have limited eligibility for membership if possible. These justices 
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dictated a less inclusive set of membership criteria than 
Indigenous communities might desire, this would not 
negate the overall benefits of an Australian ICWA. The Act 
and its protections would still apply to all the children and 
families that did meet this definition. The most important 
question, then, is what court or courts will be applying to 
these protections. 
Many of the ICWA’s most critical protections 
involve tribal courts and tribal decision-making, However, 
Indigenous communities in Australia do not currently have 
their own courts or the right to create such courts.121 
 
asked many questions designed to highlight, question, or target the 
Indian child’s blood quantum as a basis for disqualifying her from 
eligibility for Cherokee Nation citizenship. For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts inquired: 
 If—if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before 
you can call, under the statute, a child an “Indian 
child”? 3/256ths? And what if the tribe—what if you 
had a tribe with a zero percent blood requirement? 
They’re open for, you know, people who want to 
apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or—or 
any number of fundamentally accepted conversions.  
 See Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl, 570 US 637 (2013) [Baby Girl] (Oral 
argument at 38–39). The fear of “whites” claiming to be Indigenous 
has been repeatedly been cited as a potential problem with the “three-
part test” and a definition of aborigibality based on community 
recognition. See e.g. Rhiannon Shine, “Claiming Aboriginality, Have 
Tasmania’s Indigenous Services Been ‘Swamped with White People’”, 
ABC News (30 June 2017), online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-
01/tasmanias-aboriginality-criteria-relaxation-affecting-
services/8670254> (describing the controversy in Tasmania over 
relaxing the proof of descent requirement). 
121  In certain areas of Australia, courts have been created to be more 
responsive to Indigenous needs. These courts are often composed of 
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Therefore, in order for an Australian ICWA to be 
successful, the creation of Indigenous tribunals may be 
necessary. 
IV. CREATING AUSTRALIAN ICWA COURTS 
Arguably, the ICWA’s most important provisions are those 
recognising exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over removal 
and termination cases involving Indian children domiciled 
on a reservation and concurrent jurisdiction with the state 
courts over cases involving Indian children domiciled off 
the reservation.122 These provisions rely on the existence 
of tribal courts and this creates a problem for the Act’s 
implementation in Australia where there are no Indigenous 
tribunals similar to America’s tribal courts.   
A. TRIBAL DECISION-MAKING 
As quasi-sovereigns, Indian tribes have the right to create 
their own laws and be governed by them. This means they 
have the right to create independent courts that can apply 
tribal law and operate free of most state or federal court 
 
Indigenous decisions makers, but they still operate within the 
Australian legal system and are created to apply Australian law, albeit 
in a culturally sensitive way. See Lorana Bartels, “Indigenous-Specific 
Court Initiatives to Support Indigenous Defendants, Vicitms and 




122  See 25 USC § 1911(a), (b) (regarding Indian tribe jurisdiction over 
Indian child custody proceedings). 
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review.123 In child custody cases, this separation from state 
and federal control provides Indian families with strong 
protections from non-Indian bias and helps ensure Indian 
families are judged according to the norms and values of 
their community. In addition, this separation also allows 
tribal courts to operate outside a Western judicial model 
 
123  The one exception is with regard to tribal court jurisdiction. Federal 
courts may not review the merits of tribal court decisions. However, 
they do have the right to review and potentially overturn tribal court 
determinations regarding their own jurisdiction. Still, even 
jurisdictional challenges must first be heard in tribal court and may 
only be challenged in federal court after tribal court remedies have 
been exhausted. See Iowa Mut Ins Co v LaPlante, 480 US 9 at 19 
(1987) asserting that federal courts may not review the merits of tribal 
court decisions: “Unless a federal court determines that the Tribal 
Court lacked jurisdiction . . . proper deference to the tribal court 
system precludes relitigating of issues raised by the [tribal members’] 
bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts.” The US Supreme 
Court case, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield 
challenged tribal court jurisdiction under ICWA. The challenge in 
Holyfied was denied. See Holyfield, supra note 103. However, state 
assertions of jurisdiction in ICWA cases may be challenged in federal 
court and have often been overturned. Federal courts have held that a 
state’s refusal to enforce ICWA creates a federal question that may be 
heard in federal court. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v 
Alaska, 944 F (2d) 548 (9th Cir 1991) holding that federal courts in the 
9th Circuit can be used to enforce the provisions of ICWA. See also 
United States v Lopez, 2012 WL 6629601 at 6 (DSD 2012) requiring a 
non-Indian father seeking to challenge tribal court’s jurisdiction under 
§ 1914 to first raise his claim in tribal court. See also BJ Jones, “The 
Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate 
the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State 
Courts” (1997) 73:3 NDL Rev 395 (noting that “[a] party could also 
challenge a state court’s decree not to transfer jurisdiction over a 
proceeding to a tribal court based on the best interest of the Indian 
child, as this is clearly covered by § 1911(b)” at 432). 
 ICWA DOWNUNDER 211 
 
and make decisions in ways that reflect Indigenous values 
and norms. 
An Australian ICWA could include provisions 
establishing Indigenous tribunals with the authority to 
enforce the Act and make child custody determinations. 
However, because the power to create such courts would 
need to be delegated by the Commonwealth, these tribunals 
could not have the independence of tribal courts. Instead, 
they would remain subject to government oversight and 
influence. In the past, similar forms of government 
supervision have impeded attempts to increase Indigenous 
self-determination in Australia. The history of the 
Australian and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC 
or the Commission) is particularly informative and may 
demonstrate the steps needed to ensure that government 
supervision of Indigenous decision-making under an 
Australian ICWA does not become similarly detrimental.  
B. LESSONS FROM THE ATSIC 
The ATSIC was created in 1989 to provide Indigenous 
people in Australia with a voice in the federal government, 
particularly with respect to the issues affecting their 
communities.124 From the start, one of the Commission’s 
 
124  See Larissa Behrendt, “Representative Structures—Lessons Learned 
from the ATSIC Era” (2009) 10 J Indigenous Pol’y J 35 at 36. Behrendt 
noted that: 
 The objects and function, when read together, 
established a framework of responsibilities that 
conferred to ATSIC the primary role of advising the 
Federal Government on any matters relating to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and for 
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weaknesses was that it operated within a Western political 
and administrative model alien to Indigenous 
family/clan/community structures. As one critic of the 
ATSIC explained, “We are always expected to change to 
fit into a [W]estern system and way of thinking. We have 
to compromise our history and language and still the 
government will refuse to listen to our needs. We are forced 
into fitting into these models.”125 An Indigenous ICWA 
court based on delegated powers would be susceptible to 
similar criticisms. However, there were other, even more 
substantial problems with the structure of the ATSIC, and 
these difficulties also have significant implications for the 
effectiveness of an Australian ICWA and the Indigenous 
tribunals attempting to apply it. 
1. Enforcement 
The ATSIC was created to increase Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait self-determination, but the Commission had no 
independent power. This meant that its policy suggestions 
could be dismissed or ignored because it did not have the 
authority to ensure the cooperation of the Commonwealth, 
 
the oversight of all government effort in policy 
development and the provision of services to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
125  John Hannaford, Jackie Huggins & Bob Collins, Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Austl), In the 
Hands of the Regions—A New ATSIC: Report of the Review of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (November 2003) 
at 31, online (pdf): 
<old.antarqld.org.au/pdf/ATSIC_review_report.pdf>. 
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State, and Territory governments.126 The Commonwealth 
could have delegated the Commission the authority that it 
needed to ensure such cooperation, yet, it did not. This 
omission was due, in large part, to the fact that the 
relationship between the ATSIC and the Commonwealth 
was highly fraught and stemmed from the Commission’s 
dual role within the Commonwealth.  
2. Dual Loyalties 
Although the ATSIC included an elected branch, the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs remained at the top of the 
legislative structure with significant power over decisions 
made by the elected representatives. This resulted in 
tension between ATSIC’s responsibilities to the 
Commonwealth and its duties to its Indigenous 
constituents.127 This tension was especially pronounced 
 
126  ATSIC did not have the power under s. 7 of the ATSIC Act to act in a 
specific coordinating role or ensure the cooperation of the 
Commonwealth, State, and Territory governments. See Tim Goodwin, 
“A New Partnership Based on Justice and Equity: A Legislative 
Structure for a National Indigenous Representative Body” (2009) 10 J 
Indigenous Pol’y J 2 (noting that “the first independent review of 
ATSIC broadly recommended that more power be shifted to regional 
councils and that ATSIC be given greater ability to develop more 
effective relationships with State and Territory governments through 
multilateral agreements” at 5). 
127  The combination of these roles created tension between its advocacy 
and service delivery obligations. Specifically, ATSIC was to be 
accountable to the federal government in its service delivery and 
monitoring role while its elected arm was to be accountable to its 
Indigenous constituency. See Angela Pratt, Department of 
Parliamentary Services, Parliamentary Library, Social Policy Group, 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(Austl), “Make or Break? A Background to the ATSIC Changes and 
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when the ATSIC’s strategies and policies conflicted with 
the federal government’s positions128 such as the 
Commission’s focus on recognizing specific Aboriginal 
rights, a goal significantly different from the 
Commonwealth’s policy of “practical reconciliation.”129 
The Commission wanted to increase Aboriginal 
self-determination while the government was primarily 
concerned with overcoming specific disadvantages facing 
Indigenous people.130 Prime Minister John Howard (who 
 




128  See Goodwin, supra note 126 (explaining that the ATSIC had a 
mandate to formulate and implement programs for Indigenous 
Australians and to develop policy proposals at all levels but lacked the 
freedom to do this effectively at 22–23). 
129  For a discussion of the government’s policy of “practical” 
reconciliation, see Andrew Gunstone, “The Failure of the Howard 
Government’s ‘Practical’ Reconciliation Policy”, in Hurriyet Babacan 
& Narayan Gopalkrishnan, eds, The Complexities of Racism: 
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on ‘Racisms in 
the New World Order’ (University of the Sunshine Coast, 2008) 34. 
130  See Behrendt, supra note 124 (noting “ATSIC’s position had always 
been that the recognition and enjoyment of rights are required if any 
real, meaningful and sustainable progress is to be attained” at 37). The 
Commission also demonstrated its independence from the 
Commonwealth in several specific ways. For example, it aligned itself 
with regional land councils, rather than the Commonwealth, over 
proposed amendments to the Native Title Act. It produced its own 
report for the UN Committee of the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination that was independent of the government’s report, and 
it continued to seek a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians despite the Howard government’s rejection of this idea. 
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was in office from 1996 to 2007) was one of the staunchest 
supporters of “practical reconciliation.” Consequently, the 
Commission was put in the untenable position of trying to 
protect and expand Indigenous rights while also seeking 
the approval of a government strongly opposed to such 
rights.131 It was impossible. 
 
See Will Sanders, “Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian 
Government: Rethinking Self-Determination as Indigenous Affairs 
Policy” (Discussion Paper originally delivered at the Rethinking 
Indigenous Self-Determination conference at the University of 
Queensland, Brisbane, 2001), Discussion Paper No 230, 2002, Centre 
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), The Australian 
National University at 7–8, online (pdf): 
<caepr.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/2002_DP230_0.pdf>. 
131  Even before assuming the role of Prime Minster, Howard resisted the 
creation of the ATSIC, believing that it gave Indigenous peoples an 
undesirable “separate” status. In a 1989 parliamentary debate, Howard 
voiced these beliefs, stating:  
 I take the opportunity of saying again that if the 
Government wants to divide Australian against 
Australian, if it wants to create a black nation within 
the Australian nation, it should go ahead with its 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) legislation. . . . The ATSIC legislation 
strikes at the heart of the unity of the Australian 
people. In the name of righting the wrongs done 
against Aboriginal people, the legislation adopts the 
misguided notion of believing that if one creates a 
parliament within the Australian community for 
Aboriginal people, one will solve and meet all of those 
problems. 
 See Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary 
Debates (11 April 1989) at 1330, 1332  (Mr. John Howard, Bennelong, 
Leader of the Opposition), online (pdf): 
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Due to its support for Indigenous self-
determination, the Commission never received the active 
backing of the Howard Government. This left it unable to 
effectively represent its Indigenous constituents and, 
ultimately, led to the Commission being declared a 
failure.132 In 2004, the ATSIC was abolished, and its 
functions were transferred to the governments of the 
Commonwealth, states, and territories. 
C. OVERCOMING THE WEAKNESS OF 
DELEGATED POWERS 
The history of the ATSIC demonstrates the limitations and 
precariousness of delegated Indigenous rights. The ATSIC 
was not given enough power to be effective; it lacked the 
necessary independence from government control; and it 
had little protection against its own dissolution.133 
However, these problems were not inherent to the ATSIC. 
Any Indigenous decision-making body relying on 




132  ATSIC was tasked with fulfilling a number of different roles. It had 
regional councils which were elected bodies that were to represent the 
needs of their local communities and an administrative branch which 
was supposed to monitor the effectiveness of other agencies and to help 
develop programs and policies to help Aboriginal people. See 
generally Behrendt, supra note 124 discussing the difficulties that the 
ATSIC faced. 
133  The commission was abolished in 2004, and this marked the end of 
“representative structure at the national level chosen by Indigenous 
people” and a return to handpicked appointments. See Behrendt, supra 
note 124.   
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Recognizing this problem, recent Indigenous advocacy has 
focused on securing constitutional rights. 
In 2017, over 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people met at Uluru to present the Australian 
Parliament with the “Uluru Statement from the Heart”, a 
proposal to establish a constitutionally enshrined First 
Nations representative body that would provide a “Voice 
to Parliament” by enabling Indigenous Australians to elect 
representatives who would advise Parliament on policy 
affecting Indigenous peoples.134 
Unfortunately, the Commonwealth’s reaction to the 
“statement from the heart” as well as continued calls for 
“the Voice”,  demonstrate that opposition to Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander separateness and sovereignty 
remains significant.135 The Uluru Statement from the Heart 
received wide-spread public support yet, the 
Commonwealth government has, so far, refused to take 
action. In October 2017, Prime Minster Turnbull stated that 
the proposal was “neither desirable nor capable of winning 
acceptance in a referendum.”136 Turnbull also described it 
as inconsistent with democratic principles because only 
Indigenous Australians would be able to be or elect 
 
134  See Bridget Brennan, “Referendum Council Advises Government to 
Hold Vote on Indigenous ‘Voice to Parliament’”, ABC News (16 July 
2017), online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-17/referendum-
council-advises-vote-on-indigenous-voice-parliament/8716242>. 
135  See Part I discussing the long-standing Australian opposition to 
separate rights for Indigenous people. 
136  Calla Wahlquist, “Indigenous Voice Proposal ‘Not Desirable,’ Says 
Turnbull”, The Guardian (26 October 2017), online: 
<www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/26/indigenous-
voice-proposal-not-desirable-says-turnbull>. 
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members of the representative body.137 When Prime 
Minster Scott Morrison won the federal election, he 
promised to end the Commonwealth’s opposition to the 
Uluru proposal and to recognize Indigenous Australians in 
the constitution. So far, this has not occurred. Despite his 
promises of change, Morrison has rejected enshrining an 
Indigenous “Voice to Parliament” in favor of more 
“pragmatic models.”138 
The failure of the ATSIC, and the Australian 
government’s continuing opposition to Indigenous 
separateness suggests that the creation of Indigenous 
tribunals to implement an Australian ICWA would face 
significant challenges. Still, these obstacles are not 
insurmountable. An examination of the ATSIC’s failures, 
as well as the current government’s opposition to 
Aboriginal self-determination more generally, can be used 
to craft an Australian ICWA with the best chance of 
success. 
1. Enforcement Power 
The first major problem with the ATSIC was its lack of 
enforcement power.139 If an Australian version of the 
ICWA were to be successful, it would need to include a 
 
137  See ibid.  
138  Shahni Wellington, “Enshrined Voice to Parliament Ruled Out as a 
Referendum Option”, National Indigenous Television (22 October 
2019), online: <www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2019/10/22/enshrined-
voice-parliament-ruled-out-referendum-option>. 
139  One of the major criticisms of the ATSIC was that its ministerial advice 
“fell on deaf ears.” See Thalia Anthony, “Learning from ATSIC”, ABC 
News (5 January 2010, last modified 28 September 2010), online: 
<www.abc.net.au/news/2010-01-06/27934>. 
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procedure for establishing Indigenous tribunals140 and a 
method to ensure that they possessed the power to have 
their decisions enforced. Such tribunals could not be part 
of an independent judicial system like those existing on 
many Indian reservations. However, if they were created 
and housed within the current Australian court systems, 
they could have the same judicial powers as any other 
Australian court.141 In addition, as judicial rather than 
administrative bodies, these proposed courts would have 
independence from executive control and, thus, they could 
avoid one of the major problems experienced by the 
ATSIC.142 
 
140  Although many American Indian tribes have complex court systems, 
there are currently no Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander equivalents, 
and these courts would need to be created. For example, although many 
Australian jurisidctions have Indigenous sentencing courts, these are 
not Indigenous controlled and they may not apply traditional or 
customary law or forms of punishment. See Kathleen Daly & Elena 
Marchetti, “Desistance and Indigenous Sentencing Courts”, 




141  These Indigenous decision-makers would be exercising judicial 
functions as part of the judicial system and, thus, would not run afoul 
of Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. See Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, [1995] HCA 10 (requiring strict separation 
of judicial power from executive and legislative power). 
142  See Michael E Black, “The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 
Years—A Survey on the Occasion of Two Anniversaries” (2007) 31 
Melbourne U L Rev 1017 at 1022 stating “[t]he point is that there have 
always been matters of special federal concern that the Parliament has 
determined should remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal 
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These proposed Indigenous tribunals could be 
established as a new branch of the Federal Circuit Court or 
Family Court or, if the proposed merger of the Federal 
Circuit Court and Family Court occurs, as a division of this 
new Family Court system.143 Another option would be to 
have these tribunals created by vesting judicial authority in 
designated Indigenous decision-makers. In Spring 2017, 
the Turnbull Government began trialing a program to have 
certain family law disputes determined by psychologists, 
social workers, or other non-lawyers.144 It is possible that 
 
court, whether the High Court of Australia or a court created by the 
Parliament under Chapter III.” 
143  The merger was set to occur in early 2019, however, it is unclear if the 
necessary support will materialize. See Michaela Whitborn, “Family 
Court Dealt Fatal Blow Before Election”, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(4 April 2019), online: <www.smh.com.au/national/family-court-
merger-plan-dealt-fatal-blow-before-election-20190404-
p51aoc.html>. See also Matthew Doran, “Sweeping Changes to 
Family Court Announced as Broader Review of Strained System 
Continues”, ABC News (29 May 2018), online: 
<www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-30/sweeping-changes-to-family-
court-as-broader-review-continues/9813434>. Adding additional 
divisions to either of these court systems seems possible. Both the 
federal circuit court and family court were already previously divided. 
The federal circuit court was divided into the fair work and general 
divisions. Similarly, the family court was broken up into two divisions, 
the appellate and general divisions. See Catherine Caruana, 
Department of Social Services (Austl), “Round-up of Developments in 
Family Law”, Family Matters Issue No 83, Australian Instiute of 
Family Studies (October 2009) at 52, online: 
<aifs.gov.au/publications/family-matters/issue-83/family-law-
update>. 
144  “The pilot dispute-resolution project, which will involve parents 
appearing before multi-disciplinary panels without legal 
representation, is aimed at providing a quicker and less complex 
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this program could serve as an example of how judicial 
authority could be transferred to a panel of Indigenous 
decisions-makers. A particular advantage of this type of 
tribunal is that it would enable Indigenous decision-makers 
to operate outside of a traditional Western judicial 
setting.145 
Ideally, the tribunals created to determine ICWA 
cases would be community-specific. There would be one 
tribunal for each Aboriginal or Torres Strait community 
consisting of decision-makers from that community. This 
would allow for community tailored decision-making, but 
 
alternative to the courts and will have input from experts other than 
lawyers.” It will also have limited rights of appeal. See Nicola 
Berkovic, “Family Law Could Bypass Judges in Plan Being Trialled 
by the Government”, The Australian (4 October 2017), online: 
<www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/family-law-could-
bypass-judges-in-plan-being-trialled-by-government/news-
story/03083e9e2fac809d841e0f59ac3967aa>. See also Nicola 
Berkovic, “Psychologists ‘Better Placed than Judges’ to Decide Kids 
Custody”, The Australian (24 February 2018), online: 
<www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/psychologists-
better-placed-than-judges-to-decide-kids-custody/news-
story/20b59114c6a31b9c16a4987c96523e7c> quoting Professor 
Patrick stating: “The idea that a recently appointed judge with a 
background in commercial law is better at deciding parenting cases 
than a multidisciplinary panel consisting of a very experienced family 
lawyer and psychologists, psychiatrists, or others with years of 
experience in the field needs to be challenged.” 
145  The panels are being promoted as a “fast, informal, non-adversarial 
dispute resolution mechanism.” See Lydia Campbell, Department of 
Parliamentary Services, Parliamentary Library, Research Branch 
(Austl), Parenting Management Hearings, Budget Review 2017–18 
(May 2017), online: 
<www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parlia
mentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201718/ParentingHearing>. 
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it would also require the creation of numerous new courts. 
If the creation of so many new courts is not possible, an 
alternative would be the establishment of a smaller number 
of Indigenous courts, consisting of decision-makers from 
multiple communities within a specific geographic area. In 
the United States, a tribal court may only apply the law of 
its particular tribe.146 Consequently, a court representing 
multiple tribes is not possible in the US; but in Australia, 
such a court would be possible. Australian Indigenous 
courts would apply Australian law and, thus, could also 
represent more than a single Indigenous community. 
The benefit of creating Indigenous Australian 
courts is not in the application of Indigenous law. Rather, 
it is in the application of an Indigenous perspective and 
understanding to Australian law by a tribunal possessing 
the complete range of judicial powers.147 
 
146  See generally John J Harte, “Validity of A State Court’s Exercise of 
Concurrent Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: 
Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court” (1997) 
21 Am Indian L Rev 63 at 66–67 noting 
“[t]ribal court jurisdiction is limited through treaty provisions, federal 
statutes, and, in certain areas, as a result of the dependent status of 
Indian nations. Tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is also limited 
to those areas that are necessary to the protection of tribal self-
government and continued control over internal relations.” 
147  Specifically, the benefit of Indigenous child welfare courts is that they 
are part of the Indigenous community and thus, able to approach child 
welfare cases with a better understanding of the needs and experiences 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and families. See e.g. 
Deirdre Howard-Wagner, “Child Wellbeing and Protection as a 
Regulatory System in the Neoliberal Age: Forms of Aboriginal Agency 
and Resistance Engaged to Confront the Challenges for Aboriginal 
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2. Lack of Independence 
The second problem identified by the ATSIC experience 
was the organization’s lack of independence from 
Commonwealth control.148 Indigenous tribunals created to 
apply an Australian ICWA would be subject to similar 
governmental control and oversight. These courts would 
exercise delegated powers and, thus, their decisions would 
be subject to review and potential reversal by a non-
Indigenous court. Consequently, their decisions would lack 
the finality of most US tribal court child placement 
decisions, and this appellate oversight is a potential 
weakness of these proposed tribunals. However, it may 
also have some advantages. 
Instead of undermining Indigenous decision-
making, appellate oversight has the potential to create a 
level of trust and cooperation between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous decision-making bodies that is not possible 
 
People and Community-Based Aboriginal Organisations” (2015) 19 
Austl Indig L Rev 88 at 92, noting:  
 Aboriginal organisations are better placed to [help 
Aboriginal families] based on their own experience, 
including the fact that community-based Aboriginal 
organisations are able to situate the Aboriginal child’s 
well-being and care in a community-like setting, 
creating a modified kinship environment, and using 
cultural resources, to respond to the needs of the 
Aboriginal child and young person. 
148  See Anthony, supra note 139 suggesting that the success of any future 
version of ATSIC must “be measured by its capacity to develop 
independent and critical positions and the willingness of Governments 
to engage with these positions.” See also Sanders, supra note 130 at 7–
8 discussing ATSIC’s struggles to maintain independence from 
Commonwealth control. 
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with the United States’ sovereignty-based tribal courts. In 
the US, the ICWA treats state courts as hostile to tribal 
interests and limits their power over Indian children 
accordingly. Unfortunately, although this mandated 
separation between tribal and state courts is intended to 
protect tribal decision-making, it has also resulted in a 
climate of distrust that can reduce the effectiveness of the 
ICWA.  
State courts often fear that tribal courts will not 
make the “correct” child custody decisions, and this 
concern can make them unwilling to cede jurisdiction to 
the tribe. ICWA exceptions like “existing Indian family”149 
and “best interest”150 stem from such concerns. These 
exceptions assume that tribally chosen caregivers are less 
desirable than those chosen by a state court and that tribal 
assertions regarding the importance of cultural connections 
are overblown or untrue. These exceptions demonstrate 
that many state courts do not trust tribes to protect the best 
interests of their own children, and this is extremely 
problematic. 
Australia’s Indigenous tribunals would be subject 
to appellate review, but it is possible that this oversight 
could foster a level of trust and understanding that has 
never developed between tribal and state courts in the 
United States. Specifically, due to the necessity of 
 
149  See Atwood, supra note 56 at 625 describing the existing Indian 
Family exception as being “used to deny transfer in cases in which the 
court determines that despite the child qualifying as an ‘Indian child’ 
under the Act, the ICWA is inapplicable because the court determines 
the child has not been removed from an ‘existing Indian family.’” 
150  See Part V.B.2 of this article explaining the best-interests exception.  
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appellate review, an Australian ICWA has the potential to 
encourage communication and cooperation between the 
Indigenous courts and non-Indigenous courts. It could 
direct the appellate courts to view their role as nurturing 
and supporting Indigenous decision-making rather than 
policing it. 
Lastly, as Part V will discuss in further detail, the 
availability of appellate review could also help reduce the 
public’s distrust of Indigenous decision-making and thus 
avoid a problem that has proven a significant obstacle to 
ICWA’s acceptance in the United States.   
3. Dissolution 
The third problem that the ATSIC faced was its 
vulnerability to dissolution. Every unpopular decision or 
recommendation that the Commission made threatened its 
future and the potential repucussions of offending the 
Commonwealth prevented the ATSIC from effectively 
representing Indigenous interests.151 The proposed ICWA 
tribunals could suffer the same flaw unless they are 
 
151  In the end, it was the Comission’s challenges to the federal government 
that led to its dissolution. See e.g. Virginia Falk, “The Rise and Fall of 
ATSIC: A Personal Opinion” (2004) 8:4 Australian Indigenous L Rep 
17 at 17–19 (arguing that the decision “to abolish ATSIC [was] based 
on the fundamental idea that a dissident voice is better silenced. ATSIC 
consistently and audibly challenged the Federal Government over a 
number of major Aboriginal issues, including the Amendments of the 
Native Title Act 1998, and apology to the Stolen Generations, the 
introduction of mandatory sentencing laws and the formation of a 
Treaty between Aboriginal nation groups and the Federal Government. 
Its failure to follow the ‘black bureaucracy script’ made ATSIC a prime 
target for dismantling”). See also supra note 133 (discussing the 
dissolution of ATSIC). 
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afforded a comparable level of stability as that enjoyed by 
other Australian courts. 
Specifically, these tribunals must be afforded the 
ability to issue unpopular decisions without fear of 
dissolution or other retribution. Their decisions may be 
reversed by an appellate court but only if reversal can be 
legally justified. Any proposed Indigenous child protection 
legislation should, as much as possible, include assurances 
that Indigenous decision-making will be protected against 
government retaliation and withdrawal of support. These 
decision-makers need the freedom to issue potentially 
controversial decisions without worrying that such 
decisions will result in a diminishment of their power.   
V. THE BENEFITS OF A DELEGATED ICWA 
For reasons previously discussed in Part II Section D, an 
ICWA based on recognized sovereignty provides more 
robust and comprehensive protections than one based on 
delegated power. Nevertheless, if the above 
recommendations and safeguards are implemented, the 
benefits of a delegated ICWA remain significant. Such 
legislation would increase Indigenous control over child 
welfare decisions, reduce the unjustified breakup of 
Indigenous families, and keep Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander children connected to their communities and 
culture. In addition, a delegated ICWA has the added 
benefit of achieving these results in a way that is potentially 
less controversial than the United States’ sovereignty-
based approach. 
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A. ABORIGINAL CONTROL 
In the United States, the ICWA reduces the unjustified 
removal of Indian children and seeks to keep these children 
connected to their tribes and culture. The Act does this by 
increasing tribal court control over Indian child welfare 
cases and by limiting state discretion in the cases that 
remain in state court. The Australian Indigenous tribunals 
proposed in this article would not possess the exclusive 
jurisdiction exercised by American tribal courts, and no 
Indigenous child welfare decisions could be insulated from 
non-Indigenous review and potential reversal. 
Nevertheless, creating Indigenous tribunals to serve as the 
initial decision-makers in Indigenous child welfare cases 
would be a big step towards increasing Indigenous control 
over these decisions. 
In other contexts, increasing Indigenous control 
over family protection and welfare decisions has been 
shown to be highly beneficial. For example, the AbSec 
report, Aboriginal Parenting Programs: Review of Case 
Studies, noted the particular effectiveness of “Aboriginal-
led practice in the provision of parenting supports.”152 
According to the report, using Aboriginal service providers 
“strengthened community trust in the service and 
supported the engagement and ongoing participation of 
Aboriginal families.”153 Similarly, prenatal and infant care 
 
152  See Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat 
(AbSec), Aboriginal Parenting Programs: Review of Case Studies 
(January 2018) at 4, online (pdf): 
<absec.org.au/~abab2882/images/downloads/AbSec-Aboriginal-
Parenting-Support-Report-Final-January-2018.pdf>. 
153  Ibid at 27. 
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provided by Aboriginal organizations has also been shown 
to significantly improve outcomes for pregnant Indigenous 
women and their children.154 Consequently, it is likely that 
comparable benefits of increased trust and engagement 
would attach to child welfare determinations made by 
Indigenous decision-makers pursuant to an Australian 
ICWA. 
In addition, giving initial control over child welfare 
decisions to Indigenous tribunals should also help reduce 
the racial biases and cultural misunderstandings that have 
so often affected these types of cases. Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander decision-makers will be more 
familiar with the cultural practices of their communities 
than their non-Indigenous counterparts, and this should 
enable them to better evaluate the effects of child-rearing 
practices and beliefs that differ from Western norms. 
Moreover, although the decisions of these Indigenous 
tribunals could be reversed on appeal, it is likely that such 
reversals will become less frequent as the non-Indigenous 
courts become more familiar and comfortable with 
Indigenous decision-making.   
B. CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION 
In the US, tribes and their advocates are strong supporters 
of the ICWA. Nonetheless, the Act is controversial, and 
opposition appears to be growing. In fact, there is the real 
possibility that this opposition may soon result in 
significant limitations on the ICWA’s protections and 
 
154 See Esther Han, “Tailored Care for Pregnant Indigenous Women 
Improves Outcomes”, The Sydney Morning Herald (2 June 2018), 
online: <www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/tailored-care-for-pregnant-
indigenous-women-improving-outcomes-20180531-p4zikx.html>. 
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possibly even its repeal. Three recent developments 
demonstrate the growing divide between the ICWA’s 
supporters and its critics. The first is the Supreme Court 
case, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl;155 the second is the 
reactions to the codification of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs’s (BIA) ICWA guidelines, and the third is the recent 
federal district court case, Brackeen v. Zinke.156 These 
three events all demonstrate the vulnerability of the ICWA 
in face of mounting criticisms that the Act harms Indian 
children instead of helping them. 
1. Baby Girl 
Baby Girl involved a custody battle between a Cherokee 
birth father and a non-Indian adoptive couple. Immediately 
after Baby Girl’s birth, her mother placed her for adoption 
with the adoptive couple, the Cappobiancos, who named 
her Veronica. Veronica’s birth mother did not inform the 
father of the adoption but when he found out, he objected 
and immediately challenged it as a violation of the ICWA. 
Specifically, the provisions limiting a state court’s ability 
to terminate an Indian parent’s custody rights and 
mandating that Indian children are placed with Indian 
caregivers before non-Indian families may be considered. 
Neither of these protections were applied to Baby Girl’s 
adoption and, thus, the case appeared to be a clear violation 
 
155  See Baby Girl, supra note 120. 
156  See Brackeen, supra note 109. Brackeen was subsequently reversed by 
a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and is now before the 
Fifth Circuit en banc. See Brackeen v Bernhardt, 937 F (3d) 406 (5th 
Cir 2019); Brackeen v Bernhardt, 942 F (3d) 287 (5th Cir 2019). 
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of this case, it is clear that the 
ICWA and the rights it protects are vulnerable to attack.  
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of the ICWA. Nevertheless, when the case reached the 
Supreme Court, the father lost. 
Baby Girl was first heard by a South Carolina state 
family court which held that Veronica’s adoption violated 
the ICWA and that she must be returned to her father’s 
custody. This decision was then affirmed by the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals and the South Carolina Supreme 
Court. Under the language of the ICWA, the decision to 
return Veronica to her father appeared legally correct yet, 
it created immense opposition. There were protests and 
rallies, national television appearances by the adoptive 
couple, and, eventually, an appeal to the US Supreme 
Court. The rallying cry of the protesters was, “Save 
Veronica.”157 These protesters believed it was in 
Veronica’s best interest to remain with the adoptive couple. 
Consequently, they concluded that if the ICWA mandated 
her removal, then the Act was harmful to her and any other 
children like her. 
When the Baby Girl case reached the Supreme 
Court, numerous advocacy organizations submitted amicus 
 
157  See “Save Veronica”, online: <www.saveveronica.org/> (last visited 
July 8, 2019). See also Allyson Bird, “Broken Home: The Save 
Veronica Story”, Charleston City Paper (26 Sept 2012), online: 
<www.charlestoncitypaper.com/ 
charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523>; “Veronica May Not 
Be Saved”, ABC News (26 July 2012), online: 
<www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved>; 
“Local Repair Shop Joins Fight to ‘Save Veronica’”, ABC News (6 Jan 
2012), online: <www.abcnews4.com/story/16465999/emily-working-
on-this>; Haley Hernandez, “‘Save Veronica’ Effort Holds Candlelight 
Event in Charleston”, Count on 2 News (28 Jan 2012), online: 
<www2.counton2.com/news/2012/jan/28/3/save-veronica-effort-
hold-candlelight-event-charle-ar-3131169/>. 
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(friend-of-the-court) briefs, in which they attacked the Act 
as a dangerous, race-based law that harmed Indian children 
and should be abolished. These arguments appear to have 
influenced the Court’s decision.158 As Professor Bethany 
Berger notes in her article, In the Name of the Child: 
Most striking in [Baby Girl] was the role of 
race. Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
[adoptive couple’s] attorneys . . . argued that 
ICWA was unconstitutional, race-based 
legislation. . . . In the first line of the 
decision, the Court stated that “[t]his case is 
about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified 
as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) 
Cherokee.” . . . [T]he statement was untrue 
on several levels and irrelevant to the legal 
issues in the case, but it was consistent with 
an effort that has existed since colonial times 
to erase Native peoples and their sovereignty 
by facilitating the assimilation and absorption 
of Native individuals.159 
Although the Court did not specifically hold the Act 
was racially impermissible, it appears that the Court was 
highly sympathetic to these concerns. 
 
158  However, the specific holding of the case was a convoluted and weakly 
supported interpretation of the Act’s “continued custody” provision 
which the Court held did not apply to the birth father since he was never 
married to the birth mother and thus Baby Girl was never removed 
from his custody. See Baby Girl, supra note 120 at 641. 
159  Bethany R Berger, “In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and 
Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl” (2015) 67 Fla L Rev 295 
at 297–98. 
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The Baby Girl decision was a blow to the ICWA and 
its supporters, but the actual holding of the case was 
relatively narrow. It only applied to the relatively small set 
of ICWA cases in which an Indian child is placed for 
adoption without ever having been within the “custody” of 
the objecting Indian parent.160 However, more recent 
challenges to the Act pose much greater threats and 
demonstrate that the concerns articulated in the Baby Girl 
case, that ICWA harms Indian children, are still growing. 
2. ICWA Exceptions and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Response 
Baby Girl was the first time the US Supreme Court 
appeared highly receptive to the argument that the ICWA 
harms Indian children. However, there is a long history of 
state courts embracing these concerns and crafting 
exceptions to the Act as a result. Some of these exceptions, 
like the “existing Indian family exception” have largely 
disappeared.161 Unfortunately, others, such as the “best 
interests” exception, remain widespread. 
 
160  Ibid at 313–14.  
161  See In re AJS, 204 P (3d) 543 at 544 (Kan Sup Ct 2009) (overturning 
the exception and the case that originally created it). However, some 
scholars have argued that Baby Girl revived this exception. See e.g. 
Shawn L Murphy, “The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying 
‘Existing Indian Family’ Exception” (2014) 46:3 McGeorge L Rev 629 
at 647. See also Marcia A Zug, “The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple 
v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, 
but the Future of the ICWA’s Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized” 
(2014) 42:2 Cap U L Rev 327 (arguing Baby Girl did not affirm the 
EIF doctrine instead, “the Court found there was no Indian family 
because the father had no legal or physical relationship with his 
daughter, but not because he was not Indian enough” at 342). 
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The “best interests” exception is the state court 
response to the ICWA’s preference for tribal court decision-
making162 and its limitations on state court discretion. 
Courts use this exception when they wish to avoid 
transferring an Indian child custody case to a tribal court. 
The implication behind this exception is that tribal courts 
are less likely than state courts to make custody 
determinations that protect the best interest of the child.163 
State courts cannot overturn tribal court custody 
determinations and state welfare workers cannot enter a 
reservation to “check-up” on tribal children. Consequently, 
courts use the “best interest” exception as a way to get 
around the ICWA’s jurisdictional limitations and retain 
control over Indian child custody cases. 
 
162  See Atwood, supra note 56 at 657–58 discussing the “perceived 
conflict between the goals of promoting tribal survival and the child’s 
interest in becoming or remaining a member of the tribal community, 
on the one hand, and that same child’s pressing interest in continuity 
of care.” See also Holyfield, supra note 103 at 50 (recognizing the 
possibility of a conflict between the desires of the tribe and those of 
individual tribal members). 
163  Despite the presumption of transfer in § 1911(b), the Act states that 
courts may refuse transfer upon a finding of “good cause” and courts 
have interpreted “good cause” to include their own ideas regarding 
what best interests means. See Matter of Adoption of FH, 851 P (2d) 
1361 at 1363–64 (Alaska Sup Ct 1993) holding that the best interests 
of the child supports good cause to decline to follow ICWA placement 
preferences. See also In the Matter of MEM, 635 P (2d) 1313 (Mont 
Sup Ct 1981) finding best interests constituted good cause; State of 
Arizona v Moya, 667 P (2d) 234 (Ariz Ct App 1983) holding best 
interests of the child constitutes good cause; In the Matter of Maricopa 
County Juvenile Action No JS-8287, 828 P (2d) 1245 at 1251 (Ariz Ct 
App 1991) finding best interests applicable in determining good cause; 
In the Matter of NL, 754 P (2d) 863 at 869 (Okla Sup Ct 1988) finding 
child’s best interests supported good cause denial of transfer. 
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Not surprisingly, Indian child welfare advocates 
have long objected to the “best interests” exception and its 
assumption that tribal courts do not protect Indian children. 
As Professor Jeanne Carriere has written, “The notion that 
Native American tribal courts are more likely than state 
courts to neglect or inflict suffering on Native American 
children is grounded in suspicion, not in objective 
evidence.”164 Professor Carriere is correct, nevertheless, 
this perception remains widespread. 
Recently the BIA attempted to address these 
negative perceptions about tribal courts by eliminating the 
“best interest exception” and other ICWA workarounds 
through a set of binding regulations. According to the BIA, 
the inconsistent application of the ICWA165 was frustrating 
 
164  Jeanne Louise Carriere, “Representing the Native American: Culture, 
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act” (1994) 79:3 Iowa L 
Rev 585 at 629. It should be noted that this objection is not limited to 
ICWA cases. It is common for non-Indians to object to tribal court 
jurisdiction based on a perceived fear of tribal justice systems as 
inherently unfair. See Marcia Zug, “Traditional Problems: How Tribal 
Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten Tribal Sovereignty” (2017) 43:4 
Mitchell Hamline L Rev 761 at 793 discussing how fear of tribal justice 
influences objections to tribal court jurisdiction. 
165  See MacLachlan, supra note 22 (noting “the most important response 
to the inconsistent state court application of ICWA [are the] . . . new 
ICWA guidelines and revised rules” at 458). 
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Congress’s intent.166 The regulations167 were intended to 
address the historic points of contention surrounding the 
ICWA and, thus, increase compliance with the Act.168 In 
2016, the regulations were enacted, but they have done 
little to stem the controversy surrounding the ICWA. In 
fact, the new regulations may have inflamed it. Now, state 
courts have fewer options to avoid applying the ICWA in 
individual cases and perhaps that is why attacks against the 
Act as a whole are gaining traction. 
3. Brackeen v. Zinke 
Increasingly, critics of the ICWA claim the entire Act needs 
to be revised or even eliminated. They argue that the Act 
impermissibly determines custody based on racial and 
cultural criteria with little regard for whether such 
placements benefit individual Indian children.169 Shortly 
 
166  See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Final Rule, 81 Fed Reg 
38778 (2016) (codified at 25 CFR § 23) at 38782. It reads “[f]or 
decades, various State courts and agencies have interpreted the Act in 
different, and sometimes conflicting, ways. This has resulted in 
different standards being applied to ICWA adjudications across the 
United States, contrary to Congress’s intent.” 
167  25 CFR § 23 (2016). 
168  See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Final Rule, supra note 166. 
Some of these changes include clarifications for transfers to tribal 
courts, the establishment of pre-trial procedures for ICWA cases, and 
defining key terms such as “active efforts,” “custody,” “Indian child,” 
and “parent.” 
169  See Suzette Brewer, “Indian Country Braces for Battle with Adoption 
Industry over ICWA Guidelines”, Donaldson Adoption Institute (30 
March 2015), online: <www.adoptioninstitute.org/news/indian-
country-braces-for-battle-with-adoption-industry-over-icwa-
guidelines/>. This article discusses opposition to the guidelines. 
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after the Baby Girl case was decided, these arguments 
began to appear in numerous suits challenging the ICWA 
as unconstitutional racial discrimination.170 Initially, these 
lawsuits all failed.171 However, in October 2018, in 
Brackeen v. Zinke,172  a Texas district court accepted these 
arguments and found the ICWA unconstitutional. Brackeen 
was reversed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit and is now 
pending before the Fifth Circuit, en banc, yet regardless of 
how the case is ultimately decided, Brackeen marks a 
turning point in ICWA litigation. It was the first time a 
federal court declared the entire act unconstitutional. 
Brackeen involved a non-Indian foster family 
seeking to adopt an Indian child in violation of the ICWA. 
According to the potential adoptive family, the Act was an 
unconstitutional, race-based statute not narrowly tailored 
enough to achieve Congress’s stated interests without 
breaching the equal protection clause. Shockingly, the 
 
170  The most concerted effort was the Goldwater class action which 
alleged that that the application of the Act to Indian children violated 
their equal protection rights. In March 2017, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in this case, but other challenges have been filed in South 
Carolina, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Minnesota. See Suzette Brewer, 
“ICWA: Goldwater Case Thrown Out of Federal Court”, Indian 
Country Today (21 March 2017), online: 
<newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/icwa-goldwater-case-
thrown-out-of-federal-court-_RAMRUiYHUiSp1ffZ4JROQ>. 
171  See AD v Washburn, No CV-15-01259-PHX-NVM, 2016 WL 
5464582 at 4–5 (D Ariz 2016) (arguing ICWA and the BIA guidelines 
are unconstitutional). See also “Challenging the Constitutionality of 




172  Brackeen, supra note 109. 
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Brackeen court agreed. It concluded that the ICWA treats 
Indian and non-Indian families substantially differently, 
that the treatment Indian children receive is harmful and 
that this different treatment renders the Act 
unconstitutional. Specifically, the court explained the 
ICWA harms Indian children by requiring “courts and 
agencies to apply the mandated placement preferences, 
regardless of the child’s best interest.” Like other recent 
ICWA challenges, the assumption underlying the Brackeen 
decision is that ICWA allows the child welfare system to 
treat Indian children differently and worse,173 than non-
Indian children.174 
 
173  In Baby Girl, supra note 119, Justice Alito expressed similar concerns. 
He worried the Act might “dissuade some . . . from seeking to adopt 
Indian children,” which would “unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian 
children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving 
home . . . .” See Baby Girl, supra note 119 at 653–54. Justice Alito’s 
statement implies that the ICWA leaves Indian children vulnerable to 
the whims of the Indian parent and acts to delay their search for a stable 
home. See also Allison Krause Elder, “‘Indian’ as a Political 
Classification: Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare 
Act” (2018) 13:4 NW JL & Soc Pol’y 417 at 433 (discussing Alito’s 
concerns that the ICWA harms Indian children). Similarly, Timothy 
Sandefur, president of the Goldwater Institute refers to this as “the 
ICWA penalty box,” meaning the ways Indian children are harmed or 
“penalized for being Indian.” See Goldwater Institute, supra note 171. 
See also Homer H Clarke Jr, “Children and the Constitution” (1992) 1 
U Ill L Rev 1 at 29 arguing that the placement preferences and “other 
provisions of the Act effectively give tribal political interests priority 
over the interests of Indian children where adoption is concerned.” 
174  The Brackeen decision demonstrates this belief by taking pains to 
emphasize the legal difference between how placements are required 
to occur under ICWA versus how they would proceed under respective 
state law. For example, in addition to objecting to the mandated 
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Brackeen was overturned by a three judge panel of 
the Fifth Circuit and is now before the Firth Circuit en 
banc. It is likely that the reversal will be upheld. However, 
such a “win,” will not stop the attacks on the ICWA.  In 
fact,  even if the Brackeen reversal is affirmed by the US 
Supreme Court, ICWA challenges will likely continue and 
provide new opportunities for the Act to be gutted or even 
eliminated.175 Consequently, although the protection of 
tribal court independence is an important benefit of the Act, 
it is one that also makes the ICWA’s future uncertain. 
Under an Australian ICWA, Indigenous child 
custody decisions would occur within the current 
Australian judicial system. As a result, the controversy 
surrounding which court, state or tribal, best protects 
Indigenous children’s interests could be avoided. Under an 
Australian ICWA, non-Indigenous courts would retain 
appellate oversight of Indigenous decisions. If such a court 
believed an Indigenous tribunal issued a harmful or 
incorrect custody decision, they could reverse it. 
Consequently, this possibility of review and reversal 
 
preferences under ICWA, that according to the Brackeen court do not 
apply to non-Indian children under state law, the court also noted other 
differences such as if and when parties may intervene in a child custody 
proceeding, the length of time before voluntary relinquishment is 
permissible, and the length of time a final adoption decree may be 
subject to challenge. See Brackeen, supra note 109 at 529. 
175  The influence of the Brackeen decision is already being felt. Shortly 
after the case was decided, another Texas court placed a second Indian 
child (the sister of the child in the Brackeen case) with the Brackeens 
despite the fact she had Indian relatives ready and willing to take 
custody of her. See Jan Hoffman, “Who Can Adopt a Native American 
Child? A Texas Couple vs. 573 Tribes”, The New York Times (5 June 
2019), online: <www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/health/navajo-
children-custody-fight.html>. 
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should enable a potential Australian ICWA to avoid the 
most contentious aspects of the US ICWA.176   
C. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
By reviewing Indigenous child welfare decisions, 
Australia’s appellate courts would gain repeated exposure 
to Indigenous decision-making. Hopefully, over time, this 
familiarity with indigenous decisions will lead to a level of 
judicial and public trust in these decisions that has not 
materialized in the United States. 
In the US, contact between state and tribal courts is 
rare, and this has contributed to distrust between the two 
decision-making bodies. Many of the most controversial 
ICWA cases are those in which non-Indigenous courts and 
litigants presume an Indian tribunal will decide a case in a 
manner contrary to what a state court would decide, that is, 
contrary to the child’s “best interest”. As discussed 
previously, loopholes like the “best interest exception” 
were created because of these fears. However, not only do 
such exceptions undermine the ICWA, they also deny tribal 
courts the opportunity to demonstrate the falsity of these 
assumptions. 
The US Supreme Court’s only other ICWA case, 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, highlights how 
a distrust of tribes and tribal courts can undermine the 
 
176  See e.g. Vance v Boyd Mississippi, Inc, 923 F Supp 905 (SD Miss 
1996) refusing to apply the tribal court exhaustion doctrine and taking 
jurisdiction due to the fear it would be unable to review the tribal 
court’s findings. 
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ICWA and harm Indian children.177 The 1989 Holyfield 
case concerned the adoption of twin Indian children born 
off the reservation to an enrolled and domiciled member of 
the Choctaw tribe. The issue in the case was which tribunal, 
state or tribal, had the right to determine custody of the 
twins. Much of the opposition to tribal court jurisdiction 
was based on the assumption that the tribe would deny the 
non-Indian couple the right to adopt the twins and place the 
children, both of whom had special needs, in separate 
Indian foster homes and with less qualified caregivers.178 
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the tribe.179 
However, after winning the case, the Choctaw court 
surprised many ICWA critics by granting custody of the 
children to the adoptive family.180 The Holyfield case 
demonstrated how fears regarding tribal decision-making 
are often unfounded. The Holyfield tribal court, like the 
state court, concluded it was in the best interests of the 
children to remain with the Holyfields. If the state court 
had been more familiar with the Choctaw court, and more 
willing to trust it, it is possible that the long, traumatic fight 
over the Holyfield twins could have been avoided. 
 
177  See Holyfield, supra note 103. 
178  Solangel Maldonado, “Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield” (2008) 17:1 Colum 
J Gender & L 1 at 10–11 noting these concerns. 
179  The Court held that ICWA confers exclusive jurisdiction over the 
custody of children domiciled on the reservation and found that the 
children’s birth outside the reservation did not change their domicile 
which was based on the fact that their mother primarily resided on the 
reservation. 
180  See Maldonado, supra note 178 at 17. 
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Under an Australian ICWA, Indigenous tribunals 
would be located within the current Australian judicial 
system and, thus, Indigenous and non-Indigenous tribunals 
could have the opportunity to build the kind of trust that 
was lacking in Holyfield. Consequently, an Australia ICWA 
could both protect Indigenous children and families while 
also avoiding the distrust and suspicion that has hampered 
the Act’s success in the US. As a result, it is possible an 
Australian ICWA could enjoy a significantly higher rate of 
compliance than its US counterpart.181 
D. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM AND TRADITION  
An Australian ICWA would enable Indigenous decision-
makers to use their understanding of Indigenous traditions 
and customs to determine custody placements that meet the 
best interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
children. For example, such understanding of Indigenous 
culture and practices could help a decisionmaker determine 
 
181  Lack of compliance with ICWA is high in the US and not limited to 
courts. See also Zug, supra note 164 at 796: 
 As recently as 2015, South Dakota was held to have 
violated ICWA by disproportionately removing Indian 
children from their families and placing them in white 
homes. In one particularly telling example, South 
Dakota Judge Jeff Davis was found to have removed 
Indian children from their families one hundred 
percent of the time. Matthew Newman, an attorney at 
the Native American Rights Fund, stated, “We’re 
often finding states inventing any reason under the 
sun . . . not to place [the] child with [his or her] 
family.”  
 See Tanya Asim Cooper, “Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The 
National Debate” (2013) 97:2 Marq L Rev 215 at 245 discussing lack 
of compliance with the ICWA. 
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whether leaving a child with an extended family member 
constituted abandonment or good parenting. However, 
unlike tribal court judges, Indigenous decision-makers in 
Australia would not be permitted to apply a different set of 
laws to the custody cases they decided. Like all other 
Australian courts, their decisions would be based on 
applicable Australian law. This is a significant difference 
from US tribal courts. However, there may benefits to this 
limitation. 
As explained previously, tribal sovereignty means 
tribes have the right to make their own laws and be 
governed by them. These laws can differ significantly from 
the otherwise applicable state law and federal law and this 
difference is often used to oppose tribal decision-making. 
A clear example of this tendency to use tribal difference to 
attack tribal jurisdiction was demonstrated in the recent US 
Supreme Court case, Dollar General Corp v. Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians.182 
1. Dollar General Corp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians 
Dollar General involved a sexual assault against a minor. 
The alleged assault was perpetrated by a non-Indian 
employee of a Dollar General store located in Indian 
country. The child and his family brought a civil suit 
against Dollar General in tribal court.183 The company 
 
182  136 S Ct 2159 (2016) [Dollar General]. 
183  Under US law, only the federal government can prosecute non-Indians 
for crimes committed in Indian country. In Dollar General, as in the 
majority of Indian sexual assault cases, the federal government 
declined to prosecute. 
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objected to tribal court jurisdiction because they believed 
it was unfair to subject them to tribal law, rather than 
“actual law,” by which they meant state or federal law.184 
In its briefs, Dollar General emphasised that traditional 
tribal methods of dispute resolution “differed substantially 
from state and federal legal systems” and it bemoaned the 
fact that these methods “require [tribal] courts to apply 
tribal law, custom, and traditions.”185 
Dollar General’s repeatedly referenced strange and 
unfair tribal customs were used as a distraction to elicit 
undeserved sympathy from the Court. In its amicus brief 
supporting the Tribe, the federal government exposed this 
ploy stating, “Here, in particular, there is no suggestion that 
proving a breach of duty to refrain from sexual molestation 
would require resort to ‘unique customs, languages, and 
usages’ of the Tribe.”186 As the government pointed out, 
prohibiting child molestation is not some “strange” Indian 
custom; it is a core tenet of American criminal law. 
Dollar General’s arguments regarding the dangers 
of tribal tradition and custom in the context of a child 
molestation case should have appeared absurd. 
Consequently, the fact they did not is telling. As the case 
demonstrated, non-Indian mistrust of tribal customs and 
 
184  Garrett Epps, “Who Can Tribal Courts Try?”, The Atlantic (7 Dec 
2015), online: <www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/who-
can-tribal-courts-try/419037/>. 
185  In fact, the words “tradition” and “custom”—or their derivatives—are 
mentioned eighteen times in the brief. See Dollar General (Brief for 
the Petitioners). 
186  See Dollar General (Brief for the United States as amicus curiae 
supporting Respondents) at 22. 
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traditions is so great, the company believed it overcame an 
otherwise compelling desire to protect children from 
sexual predators.  
2. ICWA and Tribal Custom and Traditions 
In recent years, fear of tribal customs and traditions has 
also been mobilized to attack the ICWA. Critics of the 
ICWA routinely argue the Act is unconstitutional because 
it permits the application of a different set of laws to Indian 
child custody cases.187 These attacks intensified during the 
Baby Girl case and are growing stronger. As the recent 
Brackeen case demonstrates, the ICWA is under a very real 
threat, but it is one that an Australian ICWA might be able 
to avoid. 
The Australian Indigenous tribunals proposed in 
this article would be limited to applying Australian law. 
However, this may not be as significant a weakness as it 
first appears. Indigenous customs and traditions could still 
inform the decision-makers’ understanding of these laws 
but, because the law being applied is Australian, the use of 
custom or tradition is unlikely to create the kind of ICWA 
opposition that has materialized in the US. 
 
187  These attacks ignore the long-standing legal precedent permitting 
finding that the application of different laws for members of 
recognized Indian tribes are constitutional. See Morton v Mancari, 417 
US 535 at 547 (1974) finding an Indian employment preference 
constitutional because it was based on political rather than racial 
distinctions. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this article has argued, the lack of recognized 
Indigenous sovereignty makes a potential Australian ICWA 
less powerful than the US version. Nevertheless, such an 
act would still increase protections for Indigenous children 
and their families and could also provide certain 
advantages over the US ICWA. Still, there is one final 
difference between a sovereignty based and delegated 
version of the ICWA that should be considered before 
advocating for the passage of an Australian ICWA. This 
difference concerns the cost of failure.  
A. THE NORTHERN TERRITORY 
INTERVENTION 
The perceived failure of an Australian ICWA could have 
significant implications for future efforts to increase 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-determination. In 
fact, if the implementation of an Australian ICWA followed 
the pattern of the ATSIC and the resulting Northern 
Territory Intervention, the effects of its perceived failure 
could be catastrophic. 
The ATSIC was Australia’s first significant attempt 
to increase Indigenous self-determination and the fact it 
was a deemed a failure had wide-reaching and long-lasting 
implications. After the Commission was disbanded, the 
federal government’s belief regarding the importance of 
consulting with Indigenous people about programs and 
policies affecting their lives declined exponentially.188 At 
 
188  See Jon Altman, “Neo-Paternalism: Reflections on the Northern 
Territory Intervention” (2013) 14 J Indig Pol’y 31 at 33 discussing how 
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the same time, the ideology of assimilation gained 
momentum. Consequently, when the Little Children Are 
Sacred report was released two years after the end of the 
ATSIC (a report documenting the widespread sexual abuse 
of Aboriginal children), the government decided to put 
these new assimilationist ideas into action. The result 
become known as The Northern Territory Intervention. 
The abuse documented in The Little Children Are 
Sacred report was already well known.189 However, the 
report finally convinced the government to act on this 
knowledge. Unfortunately, rather than working with 
Indigenous communities to address the problem, the 
government unilaterally decided to enact extreme 
measures.190 
The Northern Territory Intervention involved 
military mobilisation and a set of power moves granting the 
government direct control of the targeted communities for 
 
the growing ideology of assimilation was used to justify abandoning 
the principle of consultation with Aboriginal communities on the issue 
affecting them. 
189  See e.g. Melissa Sweet, “Australian Efforts to Tackle Abuse of 
Aboriginal Children Without Consultation Raise Alarm” (2007) 335 
Brit Med J 691 noting that there had been over twenty years of studies 
documenting this abuse. 
190  The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act was 
“supposedly drafted and enacted in only 10 days—without 
consultation with aboriginal communities.” See Eddie Cubillo, “The 
Nine Most Terrifying Words in the English Language Are: ‘I’m from the 
Government and I’m Here to Help’” (2011) 13:1 Flinders LJ 137 at 145. 
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a period of five years.191 These measures were instituted 
without consulting the communities they would affect.192 
Prime Minister Howard justified the government’s actions 
as “exceptional measures to deal with an exceptionally 
tragic situation”193 and he insisted that the old policy of 
Indigenous consultation should be discarded in favor of 
unilateral intervention. In fact, Howard specifically cited 
ATSIC when arguing that Indigenous decision-making and 
self-determination had been tried and failed194 and that 
intervention and assimilation was the only remaining 
 
191  See Rebecca Stringer, “A Nightmare of the Neocolonial Kind: Politics 
of Suffering in Howard’s Northern Territory Intervention” (2007) 6:2 
Borderlands E-Journal. 
192  Remarking on this lack of consultation, Aboriginal activist Eduard 
Cubillo stated, “we members of the First Nations were expected to 
defer to the wisdom of the colonisers.” See Cubillo, supra note 190 at 
148. 
193  John Howard, “To Stabilise and Protect: Little Children Are Sacred” 
(2007) 19:3 Sydney Papers 68. 
194  Cubillo, supra note 190 at 143 noting the damage done to Indigenous self-
determination and engagement by the abolition of ASTIC and then the 
Northern Territory Intervention. See also Stringer, supra note 191 stating 
the Intervention policy was “[o]penly adopting the politics of 
assimilation and the de-realisation of Aboriginality it entails . . . to 
transform ‘failed societies’” in which there is “no natural social order 
of production” into “normal suburbs”. See also John Altman, “The 
Howard Government’s Northern Territory Intervention: Are Neo-
Paternalism and Indigenous Development Compatible?” (Center for 
Aboriginal Policy Research, Topical Issue No 16, 2007) arguing the 
abolition of ATSIC helped pave the way for Intervention through an 
increased emphasis on “Normalisation” for Indigenous Australians. 
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options for protecting Indigenous people and 
communities.195 
B. SLIPPERY SLOPE 
The goal of an Australian ICWA would be to increase 
Indigenous control over child welfare decisions. However, 
if such a law were enacted and then perceived as failing to 
protect Indigenous children and families, there is the 
danger it could actually lead to greater government 
intervention and less Indigenous control. In the absence of 
recognized sovereignty, there is no presumption that 
Indigenous communities in Australia possess the inherent 
right to make decisions concerning the welfare of their 
members. As a result, when these groups receive decision-
making rights, as they did through the ATSIC, this 
delegation of power can become a test of Indigenous 
competence and worthiness to make decisions concerning 
their lives and families. If these communities are perceived 
as failing this test, there is the real possibility this failure 
will be used to justify even greater government 
intervention. 
Australia’s experience with ATSIC and the 
Northern Territory Intervention shows how laws and 
policies intended to increase Indigenous self-determination 
can sometimes create the opposite result. If the enactment 
of an Australian ICWA is seen as encouraging controversial 
or unjust child welfare decisions, or if it simply doesn’t 
produce significant enough improvements, this “failure” 
 
195  Cubillo, supra note 190 at 148. See also Haebich, supra note 43 noting 
that these allegations were used “to rationalis[e] for mainstream Australians 
the invasive actions of the Northern Territory interventions.” 
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could be used to attack Indigenous decision-making in 
general and justify even more invasive assimilation efforts. 
Therefore, it is possible, that by passing legislation similar 
to the ICWA, Indigenous communities in Australia could 
actually wind up worse off than they were before such 
legislation was enacted. This is a real concern but 
ultimately, it may be a risk worth taking. 
Current methods of protecting Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander families are not working. Indigenous 
children continue to be removed at unacceptably high rates 
and new solutions must be found. The limited examples of 
Indigenous control over child welfare suggest this is the 
most promising solution for protecting Indigenous 
families. Therefore, Australia should consider enacting its 
own version of the ICWA. 
An Australian ICWA could not offer the same level 
of protection as the American version of the Act, but it 
could still reduce family separations and increase 
Indigenous welfare. In addition, an Australian version of 
the Act might even offer certain advantages over its US 
counterpart. Nevertheless, the history of ATSIC and the 
Northern Territory Intervention demonstrate that the 
enactment of an Australian ICWA is not without risk. 
Consequently, it is up to the Indigenous communities in 
Australia (and their advocates) to determine whether the 
possible downsides of pursuing such legislation are worth 
the potential rewards. 
